Gelweng and Titweng can both be translated as ‘cattle guard’. They are community-based groups of armed actors of the Dinka of Bahr el Ghazal region whose guardianship of communities’ cattle is a central part of their identity. Although the formation of this group may appear ad hoc and temporary, its permanence is constructed around notions of clan-membership and sometimes age-sets, and shared the norms and moral boundaries of armed conflict, as well as the spiritual and physical dangers of combat, through songs, stories and observation.

Young adult Dinka men have long had responsibility for caring for and protecting their cattle. Formed, in collaboration with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), during the second Sudanese civil war (1983–2005) in the late 1980s and 1990s, the Titweng and Gelweng were used by the community as a local defense force against Arab militias and Nuer raids. Commanders in the SPLA also used them as informal paramilitary force, carrying weapons and

equipment, and proving a large, mobile reserve of fighters. Through their absorption into the war, these groups of Dinka youth acquired weapons and became a conduit for the transformation of the war into a bigger Dinka-Nuer confrontation.

The Gelweng and Titweng continued to operate to the west of the Nile in the wake of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which provided no clear, uncontested options for their future. Local demand for their protective services also remained high, as western Dinka communities continued to experience lethal, costly raids on their cattle by the government-sponsored Arab armed militias. But new proximity to the military also spelt significant changes, reducing the influence of chiefs and elders over their behaviour and eroding community norms that had limited their participation and conduct in violence.

Military interest in the Titweng and Gelweng had also underpinned a struggle for control over the forces between the community and government and contributed to a gradual blurring of the line between home and more remote ‘political’ wars. This process has continued since December 2013, as many former Titweng and Gelweng have been drawn into the SPLA, while others fought alongside the army and incorporated into the national presidential guard known as the Döt ku Beny (“Rescue the President”).

The name ‘White Army’ or Dec in bor in Nuer, is commonly thought to derive from the ash youth use to paint their bodies for protection against mosquitos. However, the term rather refers to the lack of uniforms and training for them, and contrasts with the ‘Black Army’ or Dec in char, a Nuer term for trained soldiers in uniform. The White Armies comprise of various Nuer community defence groups in the Greater Upper Nile region. These community armies are continuations of traditional Nuer mobilisation structures.

The involvement of Nuer youth in the White Armies is closely linked to their security responsibilities at home – their role as cattle keepers and protectors of the family’s cattle wealth. Similar to other pastoralist communities in South Sudan, Nuer boys go through an initiation ceremony to become men. They are given the prime responsibility of protecting the family’s cattle against wild animals and suspected enemies. This can involve participating in ‘blood feuds’, inter-communal wars and revenge attacks. Nuer youth coordinate their protection responsibilities as part

 of territorial units at various levels – ranging from the smallest homestead unit to larger sections and even sub-ethnic groups.

The Nuer identify more closely with their immediate kinship groups than the larger sections and the greater ethnic group. Reflecting this, intra-Nuer feuds frequently occur between sections at various levels, over social matters, cattle, grazing and water points, and homicides. When faced with external threat, however, members of these groups often temporarily seek unity. This was most recently illustrated in their joint mobilisations in support of SPLA-In Opposition (SPLA-IO) during the first civil war in South Sudan in 2013.

Leadership within the White Armies is flexible and has evolved over time in response to changing security risks and dynamics.  Larger mobilisations of White Armies required the permission and guidance of Nuer prophets, who would perform sacrifices and sometimes accompany youth in battles against neighbouring communities. The violence of the first and second civil wars in South Sudan, however, precipitated the introduction of new leadership positions and fighting tactics. With rising levels of insecurity, internal fragmentation among the Nuer, and local leadership vacuums, permanent leadership positions, known as kuaar burnam, were established.

The Kuaar burnam today have an expanded range of security responsibilities during both war and peace times. While they are better known for coordinating community defence and leading revenge attacks, these leaders are also responsible for mitigating internal disputes, as well as negotiating pasture access and peace agreements with neighbours. Despite being local initiatives, the White Armies’ efficient leadership and mobilisation structures have made them desirable allies for military and political actors, as seen during the second Sudanese civil war and in the first civil war in South Sudan. The increased decision-making powers of youth and their leaders within the White Armies has not eclipsed the role of elders and influential spiritual leaders, who continue to influence, both in terms of restricting and promoting decisions to engage in violence.  As in the past, Nuer prophets play important roles in promoting internal peace and social cohesion among Nuer sections. Concurrently, some prophets have also promoted and morally sanctioned the participation of youths in large-scale violence through guidance and blessing of youth fighters ahead of raids and offensive attacks.

When war broke out in December 2013, Nuer White Armies in the Greater Upper Nile region fought alongside SPLM/A-IO against SPLM/A – in Government (SPLM-IG). Revenge for atrocities committed against Nuer civilians in Juba in the first few days of the war no doubt motivated many fighters of White Armies. Although the organisation of the White Armies takes place at local levels, political and military actors have always had strong interests in using these structures to pursue their own political and military aims.

Even though the SPLM/A-IO leadership depended on the military support of the White Armies, they did not always have control over the youth or even their leaders. Most youth, driven by local security obligations, have little interest in political agendas, long-term offensives, or being based in areas far away from home. In an attempt to enhance control over the youth and encourage recruitment into its military units, the SPLM/A-IO military leadership, like the SPLA in the 1980s, had increasingly sought to integrate Nuer youth leadership into their command structures, with the top Kuaar burnam receiving ranks, uniforms and training. The integration of former Kuaar burnam had facilitated coordination between the White Armies and SPLA-IO during joint civil-military offensives.

The term ‘Arrow Boys’ was, for years, used to describe community-based protection militias that emerged in the mid-2000s in the Azande areas to protect civilians from attacks by the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).

The ‘Arrow Boys’ (named after their primary weapon – Arrow) mobilised in 2005 following the movement of the LRA from Eastern Equatoria into Western Equatoria along the Congolese border where they attacked communities. The peace talks mediated by what was then the semi-autonomous Government of Southern Sudan reached an agreement to designate an area in Western Equatoria’s border with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as the official assembly area of the LRA.

This agreement kept the LRA in the Azande area and that exposed communities to the recurrent attacks by the LRA. The movements by West Africa’s Ambororo nomads in the area added to security fears. The alleged Ambororo collaboration with the LRA increased citizens’ perception

 t hat effective protection was urgently needed. The formation of the Arrow Boys was, thus, a response to a clearly identifiable security threat. The formation of this protection militia was supported by the then state government of Western Equatoria, and later, by the central government. This was an implicit acknowledgement that neither the SPLA nor the UN forces present in the area at the time were able to effectively protect communities from LRA attacks.

The Arrow Boys operated mainly in rural areas, along the border with the DRC, where they patrolled and responded to attacks. With the majority of Western Equatorians dependent on agriculture and hunting, the Arrow Boys functioned superbly in the bushes along the border with the DRC and the Central African Republic (CAR), to secure both hunting ground and farmland. There were very few incidents reported in which the Arrow Boys did not act in the interest of their communities, and the continued community support to them shows that they were seen as legitimate actors. The community’s response to the LRA threat, through the Arrow Boys, in the face of the SPLA’s failure to protect them from LRA attacks, was widely acknowledged to be more effective than any other armed forces stationed in the area.

Since the formation of the Arrow Boys, membership had been fluid and not limited by age or sex. Core groups were often made up of young men who suspended their livelihood activities, such as farming and hunting, to go on patrol. When security threat was high, however, the numbers of the Arrow Boys swelled (sometimes to encompass whole villages) and included women and older men, if the situation so required. Groups of Arrow Boys organised locally, with the most active operating along the border, from Maridi to Tombura counties.

Even bigger towns like Yambio, the capital of Western Equatoria state, mobilised, if needed, though, generally, only in response to high security threat. Groups depended on community donations for sustenance, with some communities collecting ‘Arrow Boy’ tax or levy. Embedded in the community, the Arrow Boys reflected and relied on local governance structures. This also meant that they generally did not pose a political or social challenge to local mechanisms.

Leadership was flexible and impermanent, often tight for the duration of a patrol but easing up soon thereafter. While many areas nominally had an Arrow Boys’ ‘head’, command structures varied significantly between individuals, and heads always worked closely with local chiefs or Payam administrators. In some areas, the Arrow Boys also supported local justice systems, working with chiefs and helping to apprehend people summoned to the local customary court. Beyond adhering to a loose hierarchy, the Arrow Boys neither clearly organised into military ranks, nor did they aspire to a unified structure across all of Western Equatoria.

The Otuho society is structured by an age-set system which allocates social and political roles, dividing the male population into well-defined strata. Women have a separate age-set system which, rather than remaining important throughout the life of an individual, is of limited significance after marriage. The position of each individual is defined by these age groupings, with members deferring to those in more senior strata. The Otuho people have four primary male age grades: Aduri (Children), Aduri-horwong (Youths – 15-20 years), Monyemiji (Owners of the village) and Amarwak (Elders). Aduri have no corporate existence. The boys are charged with various errands and other menial chores by their parents, but they are not organised to perform any chores at the behest of Aduri-horwong or Monyemiji.

The Aduri-horwong are formally organised into an age grade that is responsible to the Monyemiji. Recruitment into the age grade is carried out by the Aduri-horwong themselves but they must report to the Monyemiji. Members

 of the Aduri-horwong are in a transitional status, spending no more than seven or eight years in the age grade on their way to becoming members of the Monyemiji and, hence, recognition as adults. They perform various tasks at the ward and village levels, and their activities come directly under the purview of the Monyemiji. Violation of any social codes, either individually or collectively, attracts heavy punishment (including levy) to discourage future transgressions.

The Monyemiji are the central political and social force of the village. It is their responsibility to safeguard the security and welfare of the people and to make and implement political decisions. The Monyemiji act as a unit for the common defence of the village against external danger; they negotiate with the rainmaker chief and mollify him in times of hardship, and they discuss developments and problems in the village, trying to find solution to them.

The Monyemiji constitute the village government with a traditionally-bestowed mandate to guarantee the peaceful advancement of the people’s welfare. Their term of office runs for more than two decades (22 years) whereupon they are replaced by a new generation of leadership formalised at Efira, a ceremony which brings together people from many other villages. As for the Amarwak (elders), they have no formal political leadership role; they do not act as a corporate unit, and yet they command respect and deference from others. Furthermore, their wisdom in the customs of the people is highly respected and their advice is sought by both political novices and veterans who crave for more knowledge and influence.

Some of the powers of the Monyemiji are: monopoly in dealings with external authorities such as the government or other villages, mandate to act according to the best interests of the village, right to expel from the village anybody who subverts peace and harmony, dispute resolution, collective defence of Otuho people, censure of people who exhibit anti-social behaviour and ultimate decision-making. When the village confronts an external force threatening its security, the political powers of the Monyemiji transcend village/ward boundaries.

During the Sudanese civil wars (1955-1972, 1983-2005), Otuho people, through the Monyemiji, effectively mobilised their youth to support the armed movements fighting against the central government in Khartoum. In the South Sudanese civil wars (2013-2015, 2016-2018), the Monyemiji were less actively engaged in national conflict. Although some individual members may have joined the recent rebellion against the government, the Monyemiji, as a collective, avoided being drawn into the fighting between the SPLA-IO and the government, on either side. The Monyemiji were able to resist and deter indiscriminate attacks by government forces, reportedly because they were well-armed and organised and had clear lines of communication with the state and county government. They have played an important informal role in local confidence-building and security cooperation between the government and armed opposition. Hybrid arrangements involving cooperation between the Monyemiji, the state government and the SPLA-IO were very effective to secure roads and movement in the areas of Otuho, and was an example of hybrid security cooperation that was perceived as effective and legitimate, both by communities and authorities.

The phenomenon of the organised armed groups is new in South Sudan but it became prevalent during the counterinsurgency warfare in the Sudan’s second civil war (1983 – 2005). This phenomenon became even more rampant during the first (2013 – 2015) and the second (2016 – 2018) civil wars in South Sudan.

The proliferation of the organised armed groups increased considerably during the 2015 and 2018 Peace Agreements. This is attributed largely to the pattern of peace agreements that rewarded the armed groups in the power-sharing arrangements and created a gun-class that dominates the political marketplace in South Sudan.

South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF)*

Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) **

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