{"id":305,"date":"2015-05-05T01:30:00","date_gmt":"2015-05-04T22:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.africansecuritynetwork.org\/wp_plug\/?p=305"},"modified":"2022-07-12T08:41:53","modified_gmt":"2022-07-12T05:41:53","slug":"security-sector-reform-at-the-crossroads","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.africansecuritynetwork.org\/wp_plug\/security-sector-reform-at-the-crossroads\/","title":{"rendered":"Security Sector Reform at the Crossroads?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p><strong>By Eboe Hutchful<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Building on the statement by the German Secretary of State that&nbsp;&#8216;crisis&#8217; is the &#8216;new normal&#8217;, and taking advantage of my position as the&nbsp;first speaker on the first panel, allow me to inject some contrarian&nbsp;thoughts into today&#8217;s discussion.<\/p>\n<p>Recent developments have clearly signalled that we cannot continue&nbsp;to approach or discuss Security Sector Reform (SSR) with the same&nbsp;mantras, or endlessly interrogate the same familiar issues from SSR&nbsp;conference to SSR conference -&#8216;same-old, same-old&#8217; as we say in&nbsp;West Africa.<\/p>\n<p>The three principal developments that I have in mind are the&nbsp;following:<\/p>\n<p>1. Recent acts of terrorism have exposed African states as having&nbsp;feet of clay, simply unable (or unwilling) to confront blatant new&nbsp;security threats. All the more worrisome that what we have in mind are&nbsp;not the usual suspects, but some of Africa&#8217;s most militarily capable&nbsp;states, Nigeria and Kenya. The fact that these new threats are&nbsp;engulfing some of the strongest states in the region leads one to&nbsp;question the very concept of &#8216;fragility&#8217;;<\/p>\n<p>2. Current events in Burundi (as in South Sudan earlier) have once&nbsp;again underscored how easily painfully executed SSR programmes&nbsp;can be derailed by broader political dynamics, or unravel in the face of&nbsp;ruthless contests for political power. The case of Burundi is&nbsp;particularly poignant, as it was only recently showcased at the &#8216;Africa&nbsp;Forum on SSR&#8217; as a rare example of African SSR success, and &#8211;&nbsp;more to the point &#8211; hailed as an equally unique example of the&nbsp;positive difference made by placing governance at the heart of SSR.&nbsp;Less dramatic-but no less significant-is how longer-lived SSR&nbsp;initiatives in countries such as South Africa and Sierra Leone (also&nbsp;deemed in their day as largely successful) are slowly being shredded&nbsp;under the weight of shifting ruling regime interests;<\/p>\n<p>3. The horrendous humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean: in two&nbsp;weeks in April 1200 people (&#8216;illegal migrants&#8217;) drowned, and this&nbsp;morning alone (May 4) an additional 600 were rescued. What could&nbsp;possibly motivate large -apparently endless-streams of people to&nbsp;contemplate such desperate acts, particularly in view of the&nbsp;demonstrable dangers? On the other side of the continent, we have&nbsp;been witnessing another round of so-called &#8216;xenophobic attacks&#8217;&nbsp;against African migrants in South Africa. What appears to link these&nbsp;two sets of events are the same dynamics of poverty and&nbsp;marginalisation.&nbsp;These developments demand that we rethink SSR itself, the&nbsp;environment within which SSR unfolds, and (most importantly) the&nbsp;way(s) in which we conceive the linkage between SSR, governance,&nbsp;and development.<\/p>\n<p>Let us consider each of these in turn:<\/p>\n<p><strong>Security&nbsp;<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>&#8216;Emperors without Clothes&#8217;: African states are demonstrating&nbsp;extraordinary ineptitude at confronting serious emerging security&nbsp;challenges. The worrisome new element is that this is no longer your&nbsp;&#8216;broken states&#8217;, but now involves African states with vaunted military&nbsp;capabilities.<\/p>\n<p>It is clear that addressing these new threats requires a different skillset&nbsp;than what African security institutions are currently deploying.&nbsp;Core to this skill set is heightened intelligence capabilities. Yet&nbsp;&#8216;Intelligence&#8217; is an element that is rarely addressed &#8211; indeed often&nbsp;studiously ignored &#8211; in SSR.<\/p>\n<p>Or at least in the PUBLIC rhetoric of SSR. What is in reality is&nbsp;emerging is what some have called &#8216;two-track SSR&#8217;: on the one hand,&nbsp;the norm-driven, public &#8216;SSR&#8217;, on the other, the more covert and much&nbsp;more muscular Counter-Terrorism (CT) operations and capabilities&nbsp;(such as the regional operations in the Sahel, the Horn and in Nigeria)&nbsp;that are also closely tied to European and American security&nbsp;concerns and interests. It is already apparent (from both Kenya and&nbsp;Nigeria) that these CT operations are directly undermining&nbsp;governance and human rights, and will continue to do so as long as&nbsp;the focus is on military and police responses not informed (as my&nbsp;colleagues &#8216;Funmi Olonisakin and Awino Okech argued eloquently at&nbsp;the Africa Forum on SSR) by a wider political and social strategy.<\/p>\n<p>An increasingly urgent question is: To what can SSR be expected to&nbsp;equip African states to counter these new threats? This is not an easy&nbsp;question to answer, as it has never been clear what level of capability SSR is intended, expected or required to deliver. What one can&nbsp;conclude on the basis of available evidence, however, is that SSR&nbsp;has never been intended to deliver serious capability, offensive or&nbsp;defensive.<\/p>\n<p>This provides an opportunity to address (however parenthetically) the&nbsp;misleading opposition that some have drawn between &#8216;building&nbsp;operational capability&#8217; and &#8216;building accountable and democratic&nbsp;security governance&#8217;.<\/p>\n<p>Many critics of SSR have complained that SSR focuses too much on&nbsp;one at the expense of the other. In fact, operationally capable armed&nbsp;forces and security services are also much more likely to have both&nbsp;the discipline and institutional capacity to be responsive to civil&nbsp;oversight. For oversight is a technically complex and demanding&nbsp;exercise, both for those exercising oversight, and for those complying&nbsp;with its requirements. Conversely, there is little doubt that strong&nbsp;oversight contributes to institutional strengthening, as much in the&nbsp;security as the wider public sector. Studies (such as our own earlier&nbsp;survey of military budgeting processes in African countries) suggest&nbsp;that weak armed forces often go together with weak oversight, and&nbsp;vice versa (though there is no suggestion that strong military&nbsp;institutions necessarily or automatically sprout effective oversight or&nbsp;governance mechanisms &#8211; vide the fascinating example of apartheid&nbsp;South Africa).<\/p>\n<p><strong>Governance<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Evidence is emerging again (in Burundi as in South Sudan earlier)&nbsp;of how SSR may be destabilised by wider political dynamics. The&nbsp;reality is that SSR will remain inherently vulnerable to&nbsp;destabilisation in contested political environments where there is at&nbsp;best only tenuous respect for the rules of the game.<\/p>\n<p>In spite of constant reiteration that SSR is &#8216;highly political&#8217;, the&nbsp;reality is that we have continued to approach it as a series of&nbsp;technical fixes. There has thus been a huge gap between rhetoric&nbsp;and action in the realm of governance in SSR programming. One&nbsp;has only to &#8216;follow the money&#8217; to realise how little real priority has&nbsp;been placed on strengthening security governance even in&nbsp;contexts such as Sierra Leone. At best, &#8216;governance&#8217; has been&nbsp;approached as an extraneous layer, to be executed by &#8216;NGOs&#8217; or&nbsp;delivered through informal action (pretty much the experience for&nbsp;instance of ASSN and partners with parliamentary capacity building&nbsp;as well as our work in Liberia from 2005-2009).<\/p>\n<p>Similarly, our ideas of &#8216;democratic security governance&#8217; have been&nbsp;both exaggerated and simplistic: the SSR policy literature is replete&nbsp;with elevated norms of &#8216;security governance&#8217; that would seem&nbsp;ambitious even in a mature democracy (and certainly well beyond&nbsp;what is realistically possible in &#8216;fragile&#8217; states, often coming out of&nbsp;conflict and\/or with little or no tradition of security governance).<\/p>\n<p>For that matter, the nostrums on &#8216;governance&#8217; tend to reflect little&nbsp;understanding of the protracted, contested, and always contingent&nbsp;and uneven processes by which the metropolitan democracies&nbsp;themselves arrived at democratic security governance as we know&nbsp;it today; and little hint as well of the crisis in SSG that is roiling these&nbsp;societies as new and &#8216;unconventional&#8217; threats bring these&nbsp;arrangements (both fact and myth) under renewed pressure. It&nbsp;would be much more realistic and helpful to see SSG as a global&nbsp;problem &#8211; and organise candid dialogue around that issue &#8211; rather&nbsp;than present it as yet another Northern solution to a distinctively&nbsp;&#8216;Southern&#8217; problem.<\/p>\n<p>The prevailing naivety is also partly linked to the tendency in the&nbsp;SSR lexicon to view security institutions in terms of &#8216;service&nbsp;delivery&#8217; (which is indeed part of their raison d&#8217;etre) rather than as&nbsp;pre-eminently apparatuses of power at the heart of the state &#8211;&nbsp;underscoring, once again, the deficits in the analysis of both the&nbsp;state and power that permeates much of the SSR discourse.<\/p>\n<p>At the core of politics and SSR (or the politics of SSR) is the&nbsp;question rarely raised: which social, political or class factions are&nbsp;going to control those apparatuses. Probably the most insightful &#8211;&nbsp;and at the same time neglected &#8211; observation in Samuel&nbsp;Huntington&#8217;s 1957 book The Soldier and the State is the argument&nbsp;that the state of &#8216;civil-military relations&#8217; depends less on the&nbsp;relationship between the military and civilians than on the&nbsp;relationship between contending civilian groups or interests&nbsp;interested in acquiring control over the military as an instrument of&nbsp;political supremacy. Opposing political interests are tempted to use&nbsp;the military against each other, entailing attempts to monopolise&nbsp;control. (Of course we have learned in Africa that the contest for&nbsp;power between military and civil power is also very much an issue).<\/p>\n<p>An associated danger &#8211; as we are again seeing in Burundi today &#8211;&nbsp;is that political gridlock and contestation between civilian parties&nbsp;over fundamental rules of the game place the military in a position&nbsp;to make political decisions (or execute political interventions) for&nbsp;which it is ill-equipped.<\/p>\n<p>The core problem is precisely that we have failed to commit African&nbsp;leaders and elites (security elites included) to respect for the wider&nbsp;rules of the game. In essence, we have created &#8220;democracies&#8221;&nbsp;without democrats, and in the process exposed security institutions&nbsp;to their own political calculus.<\/p>\n<p>We have also (surprisingly) neglected entirely to address political&nbsp;parties or to view them as key SSR actors &#8211; as the principal&nbsp;instruments for organising democratic power, gestating norms and&nbsp;programmes, and shaping political policies and practices. Few indeed are the political parties in Africa that have any firm&nbsp;orientation on the specific issue of security governance; attitudes&nbsp;on this question (all too often reflected as well among&nbsp;parliamentarians) can often be described as ad-hoc, opportunistic,&nbsp;or abstentionist (&#8216;leave it to the President or the executive&#8217;). Our&nbsp;preoccupation with &#8216;civil society organisations&#8217; &#8211; while entirely&nbsp;legitimate &#8211; appears however to have cascaded directly down from&nbsp;the (neoliberal) suspicion of the state and politics (and all things&nbsp;connected therewith) that characterised much of the 1980s. The&nbsp;disregard &#8211; even marginalisation &#8211; of political parties that went&nbsp;along with this ideology is overdue for reconsideration.&nbsp;This links up with the wider question of elite incentives that my copanellist&nbsp;Erwin van Veen and colleagues have been exploring: as&nbsp;with the previous generation of structural adjustment or public&nbsp;sector reform, what incentives are there for political elites to do&nbsp;things any differently than they have done in the past, particularly&nbsp;given the high political risks &#8211; and unpredictable outcomes &#8211; of&nbsp;SSR?<\/p>\n<p>It is no longer just an issue of revitalising the governance agenda&nbsp;(i.e. acknowledging that the element of governance is more at risk &#8211;&nbsp;as well as gestator of risk &#8211; than ever before), but also rethinking&nbsp;and expanding the remit of that agenda, to include political&nbsp;engagement and dialogue with extremists and &#8216;rejectionists&#8217; of all&nbsp;stripes as a means to counter radicalisation.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Development<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>It is by now clear that whatever our model of development is, it is not&nbsp;working for the poor, the vulnerable and the youth.&nbsp;This is the message that links the dramatic media clips of recent&nbsp;days: the ease (and frequency) with which youth are being&nbsp;radicalised, the desperate waves of migrants trying to cross the&nbsp;Mediterranean, and the xenophobic attacks in South Africa. It is a&nbsp;message of deep marginalisation and political and social&nbsp;alienation.<\/p>\n<p>It is equally alarming to realise that, given the right context, these&nbsp;same actors might be interchangeable: gravitating as easily in the&nbsp;direction of Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram as braving the&nbsp;Mediterranean, &#8211; or in earlier days, toward revolutionary Marxism&nbsp;rather than religious extremism.<\/p>\n<p>In other words, what we are witnessing is the comprehensive&nbsp;failure of the vision of Human Security driving SSR, in turn&nbsp;generating threats out of all proportion to anything that SSR is&nbsp;designed to address or prevent.<\/p>\n<p><strong><em>Professor Eboe Hutchful is Executive Secretary of the African&nbsp;Security Sector Network (ASSN). This is the text of a&nbsp;presentation he gave at a conference on &#8216;Security Sector&nbsp;Reform and Governance: Reviewing Germany&#8217;s&nbsp;Contribution,&#8217; organised on May 4, 2015, by the German&nbsp;Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin.<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>By Eboe Hutchful Building on the statement by the German Secretary of State that&nbsp;&#8216;crisis&#8217; is the &#8216;new normal&#8217;, and taking advantage of my position as the&nbsp;first speaker on the first panel, allow me to inject some contrarian&nbsp;thoughts into today&#8217;s discussion. Recent developments have clearly signalled that we cannot continue&nbsp;to approach or discuss Security Sector Reform&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"tpl-full-width.php","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-305","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-uncategorized"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.6 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Security Sector Reform at the Crossroads? - African Security Sector Network<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.africansecuritynetwork.org\/wp_plug\/security-sector-reform-at-the-crossroads\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_GB\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Security Sector Reform at the Crossroads? - African Security Sector Network\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"By Eboe Hutchful Building on the statement by the German Secretary of State that&nbsp;&#8216;crisis&#8217; is the &#8216;new normal&#8217;, and taking advantage of my position as the&nbsp;first speaker on the first panel, allow me to inject some contrarian&nbsp;thoughts into today&#8217;s discussion. 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- African Security Sector Network","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.africansecuritynetwork.org\/wp_plug\/security-sector-reform-at-the-crossroads\/","og_locale":"en_GB","og_type":"article","og_title":"Security Sector Reform at the Crossroads? - African Security Sector Network","og_description":"By Eboe Hutchful Building on the statement by the German Secretary of State that&nbsp;&#8216;crisis&#8217; is the &#8216;new normal&#8217;, and taking advantage of my position as the&nbsp;first speaker on the first panel, allow me to inject some contrarian&nbsp;thoughts into today&#8217;s discussion. Recent developments have clearly signalled that we cannot continue&nbsp;to approach or discuss Security Sector Reform&hellip;","og_url":"https:\/\/www.africansecuritynetwork.org\/wp_plug\/security-sector-reform-at-the-crossroads\/","og_site_name":"African Security Sector Network","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASSN.ASA\/","article_published_time":"2015-05-04T22:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2022-07-12T05:41:53+00:00","author":"assnadmin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@assn_africa","twitter_site":"@assn_africa","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"assnadmin","Estimated reading time":"11 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.africansecuritynetwork.org\/wp_plug\/security-sector-reform-at-the-crossroads\/#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.africansecuritynetwork.org\/wp_plug\/security-sector-reform-at-the-crossroads\/"},"author":{"name":"assnadmin","@id":"https:\/\/www.africansecuritynetwork.org\/wp_plug\/#\/schema\/person\/2d4a60a29e56f330cd03e3d5ed047f61"},"headline":"Security Sector Reform at the Crossroads?","datePublished":"2015-05-04T22:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2022-07-12T05:41:53+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.africansecuritynetwork.org\/wp_plug\/security-sector-reform-at-the-crossroads\/"},"wordCount":2169,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.africansecuritynetwork.org\/wp_plug\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Uncategorized"],"inLanguage":"en-GB"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.africansecuritynetwork.org\/wp_plug\/security-sector-reform-at-the-crossroads\/","url":"https:\/\/www.africansecuritynetwork.org\/wp_plug\/security-sector-reform-at-the-crossroads\/","name":"Security Sector Reform at the Crossroads? 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