



ASSN Quarterly

Newsletter of the African Security Sector Network

No. 1 /2012

January 2012

ASSN Quarterly is published by the African Security Sector Network. It highlights the activities of the network, as well as other developments in the fields of Security and Justice Reform, both in Africa and beyond.

The views expressed in the articles published in this newsletter are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the African Security Sector Network.

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Welcome to the second Issue of our Newsletter



There were three notable events over this quarter that we report on in this issue (along with other highlights).

The first (in chronological order) was an ASSN mission to the Republic of South Sudan, in November 2011, to explore areas of possible collaboration with the Government of the South Sudan (GoSS) on Security and Justice Reforms (SJSR).

The team met with officials from the GoSS, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and other members of the International and Regional Community, including the African Union (AU) Liaison Office and the civil society in Juba, and came away with positive insights into the potential contribution that the ASSN could make, not least in elevating African and regional presence in the new state's SJSR agenda.

The second was the outdoor of the publication, *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector : ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians*, at a regional parliamentary workshop organised by the National Assembly of Mali, the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and the ASSN in Bamako, Mali, on November 28-29. The *Guide* was developed collaboratively by the ECOWAS Parliament and DCAF but authored largely by ASSN experts led by Professor Boubacar N'Diaye.

The adoption of the *Guide* (the first of its kind in Africa) is an important landmark in ECOWAS's on-again, off-again efforts to advance accountability of the sub-region's historically unruly and problematic security institutions. At the moment, most ECOWAS (and African) parliaments have, at best, limited roles in security policy-and decision-making processes and oversight, especially in core areas like defence spending and intelligence; hence, there was no illusion in Bamako as to the level of effort and political will required to take these legislatures from their current state to the elevated levels of security oversight envisioned in the *Guide*. The workshop recognised this by elaborating a number of steps designed to build capacity among regional parliaments, mobilise the necessary resources and partnerships, and monitor progress towards the normative targets of the *Guide*.

For the ASSN and others with an active interest in issues of oversight, the *Guide* at the very least provides a framework for more purposive capacity-building efforts on behalf of the sub-region's parliamentary defence and security committees (which have, in general, received little support, all the rhetoric notwithstanding), as well as possibilities of collaboration with ECOWAS.

The third event was a one-day preparatory workshop on *SSR in Egypt*, mounted in Cairo on 11 December 2011 by the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), a partner of the ASSN – and a co-founding peer organisation in the Global Consortium on Security Transformation (GCST).

The so-called 'Arab Spring' has thrown up urgent (but at the same time complicated) issues with regard to the conduct and governance of security institutions in the region, and particularly their relationship with ruling regimes, civil society and national populations. From the standpoint of the work of the ARI, the timing could not have been more propitious. At a time when the landscape in the region was considered at best inhospitable to SSR or political reform in general, ARI had already put in place a research project on 'Securitocracies and Security Sector Reform in the Arab World', rounding off with a conference in Madrid on November 4-6 2010, just as the so-called 'Arab Spring' was about to break, completely transforming the political landscape and propelling issues of Security Sector Reform/Governance (SSR/G), and more broadly political reform, to the top of the national and regional agenda.

While national contexts and dynamics vary, it is nevertheless clear that the region as a whole offers new, extraordinary horizons of both opportunity and challenge to SSR, given the deep (and wide) tentacles of the region's 'securitocracies', the geopolitics of oil, the growing strength - paradoxically - of Islamist movements as the 'democratic revolutions' have unfolded, and the intersection of SSR with other complex issues of political transition and socio-economic reform.

Have an enjoyable read!

Eboe Hutchful
Chair, African Security Sector Network
(ASSN)



PROFESSOR BOUBACAR N'DIAYE co-edited a new parliamentary oversight guide for legislators from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Titled *Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians*, the publication contains contributions from various experts in the field of Security Sector Governance, particularly from West Africa and among them several ASSN members.

Professor N'Diaye co-edited the book with Hans Born and Jean-Jacques Gacond from the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).



DR. SANDY AFRICA published a new book titled *Well Kept Secrets: The Right of Access to Information and the South African Intelligence Services*.

The book will be reviewed in the April edition of the ASSN Quarterly newsletter.



BRIGADIER-GENERAL KELLIE CONTEH has been appointed Senior Security Sector Reform Advisor at the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), based in Juba.

Brigadier General Conteh was formerly National Security Coordinator of the Republic of Sierra Leone.




LEYMAH R. GBOWEE was appointed by Liberian President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf to head a National Peace and Reconciliation Initiative following the country's controversial 2012 election.

Gbowee and President Johnson-Sirleaf, both Liberian, were awarded the 2011 Nobel Peace Prize, jointly with Tawakkul Karman of Yemen.



ELOM KHAUNBIOW, Senior Programme Assistant at the ASSN secretariat in Accra, commenced his masters studies in International Security and Defence at the University of Grenoble.

Khaunbiow also holds a masters degree in International Human Rights Law from the University of Nantes.



LENSA KWADJO joined the ASSN office in Addis Ababa as an intern. Lensa has a BA in International and Area Studies from New College of Florida, majoring in African Regional Security.

She has previously interned in Washington D.C. with Constituency for Africa (CFA), an organisation dedicated to advancing African interests within the United States Congress.

Gender and the Security Sector: Theory of Change Workshop

The Africa Security Sector Network (ASSN) has commissioned a baseline study to aimed at providing evidence-based information on the status of Gender mainstreaming at the national level, as part of the ASSN's effort to support the operationalisation of the African Union Security Sector Reform (AU SSR) Policy Framework.

The decision to undertake this baseline study was informed by the fact that efforts in Africa to integrate Gender and women's rights perspectives into Security and Justice Sector Reform are largely undocumented and unreported. The baseline study will build upon existing Gender assessments and surveys of security sector institutions to provide information that is relevant for programming and subsequent impact assessments of Gender initiatives within security and justice sector reform programmes.

On 15-16 November 2011, the ASSN organised a two-day Theory of Change (TOC) workshop in Accra, Ghana, as the first step towards developing the overarching research questions for the baseline study, as well as to guide the research questionnaires and provide advice to the consultants who will be undertaking the research.

The workshop had 14 participants from a range of backgrounds and disciplines. These included representatives from the International Crisis Group (ICG), the Ghana Police Service, WIPSEN-Africa, the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) and Ghana Ministry of Women and Children Affairs (MOWAC) and ASSN programme staff.

There were three main objectives for the workshop:

- To understand the rationale for promoting Gender in SSR and the assumptions implicit within this;
- To engage the country research-leads and ensure a common understanding of the context and rationale for the study;
- To develop a set of overarching research questions to frame the baseline study.

The workshop was not intended to in detail develop possible interventions or policy objectives, though these aspects were discussed as part of the overall process.

With the engagement objective in mind, the workshop was highly participatory. There were very few short presentations by the facilitators and the majority of work was done by the participants in small groups. The participants were mixed around as much as possible to ensure that they were all exposed to a range of opinions from different stakeholders.

The activities undertaken during the workshop encouraged participants to think about Gender and SSR in the broader social, political and economic context. The workshop was structured to enable them think holistically about all dimensions of the problem, progressively narrow the focus to areas of likely intervention and identify the specific indicators or behaviours that the researchers could assess during the baseline study.

Through a range of exercises, the workshop led participants to:

- Reach a common understanding of Gender and SSR;
- Agree on a vision for Gender and SSR;
- Define what needs to happen for this vision to be realised ;
- Identify what the ASSN can do to bring about change and how this will contribute to the overall vision ;
- Outline some indicators of change ;
- Determine some key research questions for the baseline study.

The baseline study is currently being undertaken in Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Conakry, Sierra Leone and South Sudan.



Images from the 'Theory of Change Workshop' in Accra:

Facilitators guide proceedings at the workshop (above and left); A cross section of the participants during one of the sessions (right).



Briefing to Francophone Ambassadors On the African Union SSR Policy

This meeting to brief ambassadors from French-speaking African countries on the African Union (AU) Security Sector Reform Policy Framework briefing was requested and sponsored by the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF). Held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 13 December 2011, it was attended by representatives from Burundi, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), The Republic of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), Gabon, Mali, Morocco, Senegal, and Rwanda. Several other non-African countries (Austria, Belgium, Romania, Switzerland and the United Arab Emirates) were also present.

The discussion was preceded by three presentations. The first by Niagalé Bagayoko (OIF) focussed on the specificities of the Security Sector in Francophone Africa. The second presentation by Professor Kossi Agokla of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament (UNREC) dwelt on Democratic Control of the Security Sector, while in the third presentation, Lieutenant-Colonel Christophe Touko of the African Union focussed on the AU Security Sector Reform (SSR) Policy Framework itself.



Dr. Mpako Foaleng from the International Security Sector Advisory Team (ISSAT) also delivered brief remarks about ISSAT and its relationship with the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), pointing out the possibilities presented by the partnership between these two organisations in terms of support for the operationalisation of the AU policy.

A critical discussion followed in which a number of pertinent issues were raised. These included discussions as to how workable a continental SSR policy could actually be made, given the peculiarities of the Francophone, Lusophone, Anglophone and Arab security systems on the continent; how and to what extent civilians could actually gain the capacity to engage with the Security Sector in Africa, given its general lack of transparency; what level of credible and effective parliamentary oversight is to be expected, given the fact that parliaments in many African countries have little independence beyond supporting the executive and the ruling party; and whether donors can support SSR in African countries without trying to influence the process in their own interest. The discussion also pointed to problems of translation and challenges of rendering English concepts and terminologies (such as 'accountability' and 'national ownership') into French. [1]

[1]"Accountability" (a concept apparently unfamiliar to most French speakers) is translated (confusingly) as "redevabilité", while 'national ownership' is rendered formally as "propriété" (ownership) in the AU policy document, colloquially the French word "appropriation" (in English, 'appropriation', or the process of acquiring ownership) is used to communicate the concept.

Feature Photo: Participants at a validation workshop to streamline the modules used in Togo's military training institutions. Conducted on 16-17 June 2011 in Lomé, the workshop was organised by the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) in collaboration with the Togolese Armed Forces and the African Security Sector Network (ASSN).



Inaugural Stakeholders' Dialogue Forum on Kenya's 'Agenda Four Reforms'



On 30 November 2011, the Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC) held the first of its Stakeholders' Dialogue Forums, to be held quarterly under a project themed "Leveraging Political Space in the New Kenyan Constitutionalism: Enhancing Civil Society and Community Engagement with the 'Agenda Four Reforms,'" which SRIC is currently implementing jointly with the African Security Sector Network (ASSN).

The project aims to facilitate momentum towards the finalisation of the "Agenda Four Reforms", a series of indispensable reforms that were identified by Kenya's national unity government with the aim of liberating the country from historical grievances that precipitated deadly ethnic and class clashes in the wake of the disputed 2007 presidential election, leaving an estimated 1,300 people dead and another 350,000 displaced.

SRIC is specifically focussing on aspects of the "Agenda Four Reforms" that relate to Security and Justice. The quarterly stakeholders' forums are aimed at providing a platform for key stakeholders to take stock of the pace and direction of the "Agenda Four Reforms", thereby ensuring the process remains on track, identifying challenges on the path towards reform and collectively devising appropriate ways of overcoming such challenges.

The inaugural forum, held at the Nairobi Safari Club, brought together virtually all stakeholders involved in the implementation of the "Agenda Four Reforms" and some of the implementation committees that were set up following the promulgation of Kenya's new constitution in August 2010 as the first step of the "Agenda Four Reforms".

There were 28 participants, including members of the civil society, officials from the Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Security and Provincial Administration, the Ministry of Youth Affairs, the State Law Office, the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), the Kenya Police Service and members of the academia. The ASSN was represented at the forum by its Information and Communications Officer, Philip Emase, who gave an overview of the ASSN's mission and its relationship with SRIC.

Discussions ranged from in-depth analyses of the current state of affairs in Kenya; the challenges of building a truly cohesive nation following the deadly ethnic and class violence that occurred during the 2007/2008 post election period; opportunities and challenges for national reconciliation; discussion on the particular aspects of the Kenya Police Service that need reform, as well as future prospects for broader Security and Justice Reforms.

Going forward, the meeting resolved that as the country inches closer to the next election in 2012 - the first to be held under the new constitution - the civil society needs to proactively engage with the other stakeholders and especially the governmental ones so as to ensure the "Agenda Four Reforms" are implemented on schedule to avoid the possibility of violence around the 2012 presidential election, which is now only a few months away.

SRIC will lead these efforts by maintaining constant engagement with relevant government departments and agencies through dialogue; providing any necessary expert support or advice that may be required in order to stay on course; monitoring the implementation process and timelines as entrenched in the new constitution; conducting civic education programmes; and undertaking periodic research to measure the perception and level of knowledge of the implementation process among the Kenyan citizenry.

Left: A group photo of the participants at SRIC's inaugural stakeholders' forum in Nairobi, Kenya. The forums will be held on a quarterly basis to help monitor and help facilitate the implementation of the 'Agenda Four Reforms'. SRIC is the ASSN's regional hub for East Africa and the Great Lakes Region.



Regional Training Workshop on Security Sector Reform



The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), through its Sub-Regional Office for Central Africa (SRO-CA), held a regional training workshop on Security Sector Reform (SSR) on 29 November – 1 December 2011 in Douala, Cameroon.

The main objective of the workshop was to enhance the capacities of SSR actors in post-conflict countries, with particular reference to Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and South Sudan).

Other key aims of the workshop were to explain the SSR concept; State security (border control, the army, security information agencies, rangers, customs and immigration, police, the gendarmerie, as well as the role of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration/DDR); Security management and oversight bodies; Traditional bodies involved in the security sector: Human security; International humanitarian law; International human rights law; the impact of the SSR on economic issues.



The workshop more specifically sought to: Sensitise government representatives on the importance of SSR; Familiarise participants with the concept of SSR; Engender discussion and exchange of ideas on diverse approaches and possibilities for SSR programmes; Enable the sharing of experiences and SSR best practices; Discuss the link between SSR and development; Create a partnership among diverse actors within the domain of SSR; and Establish a network of practice.

The role of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), represented at the workshop by Elom Khaunbiow, was to provide a comparative analysis of the institutional security and defence frameworks in Francophone and Anglophone countries in Africa, including the practice of Parliamentary oversight; Regulations regarding the deployment and conduct of security services; Security institutions and their roles; Judicial institutions; and the Role of the police in peacekeeping missions/operations.

ARI Meeting on Security Sector Reform in the Arab World

While the Arab world has experienced tremendous social and political change over the past year, the reform/transformation of the Security Sector has emerged as one of the most critical and urgent issues that need to be tackled.

Building upon its previous project on "*Securitocracies and Security Sector Reform (SSR) in the Arab World*" (see <http://www.arab-reform.net/spip.php?rubrique27>), the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) has been scaling up its engagement on this crucial topic, in view of producing quality and innovative research that could be used by stakeholders in countries within the region. In this context, the ARI has started working on police reform - a subject that has been the subject of much debate in Egypt

and Tunisia - but it is also taking a broader perspective by addressing other security institutions and examining ways in which they can play their rightful role in a democratic setting.

One meeting of the Egyptian working group took place in Cairo on 11 December 2011, with the participation of Dr Gavin Cawthra, an SSR expert from the African Security Sector Network (ASSN). This meeting was conceived as a first opportunity for experience sharing between African and Arab experts in the field of SSR. The next step in this direction is expected to be the organisation of an Arab regional workshop in Tunis in the Spring of 2012. ASSN experts will be invited to participate.

Source: *Virginie Collombier*

The Second Annual Southern Africa Regional Security Dialogue



The Southern African Defence and Security Management Network (SADSEM) and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) co-organised and conducted the second annual Southern Africa regional security dialogue in Maputo, Mozambique, on 27-28 October 2011.

The annual regional security dialogue was established by members of the SADSEM and FES networks in the region - who include scholars, senior government and security officials and civil society actors - as a platform on which they could examine the peace and security challenges facing Southern Africa as a region.

In this year's annual dialogue, delegates explored a focused range of issues related to peace and security in Southern Africa. In particular, the meeting dealt with peacemaking and security challenges in maritime security; the newly-revised strategic plan for the implementation of peace and security through the Southern African Development Community (SADC); South Africa as a driver of regional security or insecurity; democratic challenges in Swaziland; and mediation and security co-operation in Zimbabwe.

Based at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg, SADSEM is the ASSN's regional hub in Southern Africa.

ASSN/CPRD Joint Mission to South Sudan

In keeping with its mission of promoting an African-centred agenda and African presence and expertise in the areas of Security and Justice Sector Reform (SJSR), the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) undertook a week-long mission to South Sudan on 2-9 November 2011, with support from the Security and Justice Group in the Stabilisation Unit at the UK Department for International Development (DFID).

The ASSN team comprised Lieutenant-General (Rtd) Gebretsadkan Gebretensae (Executive Director of the Centre for Policy Research and Dialogue (CPRD) and Team Leader), Professor Eboe Hutchful (Chair, ASSN), Brigadier-General (Rtd) Kellie Conteh (then National Security Coordinator of the Republic of Sierra Leone), and Ecoma Alaga (Senior Programme Manager, ASSN, and gender expert).

The main purpose of the mission was to explore potential entry points and opportunities for the ASSN to work with the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) on issues of security and justice reform in the new state.

Of particular interest to the mission (and reflecting the expressed priorities of the GoSS) were the following issues:

- i) the Establishment and operationalisation of a national security architecture, including a national security council and secretariat;
- ii) Development of a national security policy/strategy;
- iii) Intelligence reforms;
- iv) Security literacy and capacity development for oversight bodies like parliament and the relevant ministries such as Interior, Defence and Veteran Affairs, and
- v) Improved cooperation between the African Union (AU) and the GoSS.

Additional areas explored by the mission team included i) the role and current capacity of the South Sudanese civil society in relation to security oversight; ii) Approaches to gender issues in ongoing security and justice reforms; and iii) Potential linkages between SJSR efforts in the South Sudan, the AU SSR Policy Framework (AUSSRPF), and broader African SJSR experiences.

The ASSN team conducted interviews and focus group discussions with a variety of stakeholders: from the GoSS; the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS); members of the International and Regional Community (including the African Union (AU) Liaison Office); and finally civil society and women's groups, mainly targeting actors in Juba.

The perception of the mission is that the GoSS is keen to kick-start work in the areas listed above. In addition it is keen to a) facilitate effective coordination of international assistance as to ensure coherence with the GoSS' priorities and aspirations and among the plethora of external actors; b) ensure these processes are achieved through a consultative, inclusive, representative and participatory approach; and c) draw on support and expertise from African institutions, notably the AU and other African countries.

The international community has a high (and still growing) profile in terms of various levels and areas of support for security and justice sector reforms in South Sudan (by contrast, the African presence has been minimal and fragmentary). Among the actors interviewed by the mission (to cite only two), UNMISS plans (under its new mandate) to field a strong SSR team, with programmes that will include police reform and support for state level security coordination mechanisms. Adam Smith International (ASI) is running an advanced UK-funded Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation (SSDDT) programme; and supporting the Joint Operations Centres (JOC), State Security Committees (SSC), parliament and the civil society (including facilitating a civil society security sector dialogue forum).

The South Sudanese civil society has also been engaged in these processes mainly through the auspices of the Civil Society Security Sector Dialogue Forum. However, Civil Society appears to be constrained by limited access to information on the reform effort, lack of funding, tensions with (the much larger and often better funded) international NGOs, narrow focus of operations (e.g. referendum, elections), weak capacity for (evidence-based) research, analysis and programme management, and politicisation along ethnic lines.

All four categories of stakeholders welcomed the prospective role of the ASSN, while at the same time underscoring the huge and complex challenges confronting the South Sudanese security sector and the country as a whole.

The consensus of opinion was that were several key areas where the ASSN could add value to the ongoing and emerging reform efforts. These include (but are not limited to) the various processes associated with:

- (a) Developing a national security policy and strategy;
- (b) Establishing a coordinating secretariat for the NSC;
- (c) Institutional reforms within the intelligence agency, police and border management agencies;
- (d) Enhancing strategic awareness and security literacy among senior GoSS officials, parliamentarians and civil society;
- (e) Gender mainstreaming; and
- (f) Facilitating linkages with the AU and other African actors.

The ASSN is exploring a framework agreement with the GoSS to allow collaborative work in these areas.



President Salva Kiir of South Sudan

New Book on Security Sector Governance in Francophone West Africa



A conference was held in Paris, France, on 6 December 2011, to mark the launch of the book *Gouvernance du Secteur de la Sécurité en Afrique de l'Ouest Francophone: Bilan et Perspectives*, edited by Alan Bryden of the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and Boubacar N'Diaye of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN).

In addition to the contribution of Professor N'Diaye, most of the chapters in this volume were written by ASSN members, and the book is intended as a follow-up to the earlier publication *Challenges of Security Sector Governance in West Africa* (2008), also co-edited by Bryden and N'Diaye, along with Dr. 'Funmi Olonisakin.

The well-attended conference was organised by DCAF and sponsored by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The opening ceremony was chaired by Ted Winkler, the Director of DCAF, and was attended by various departmental directors in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and senior executives from the European Union.

General Lamine Cissé, a former Chief of General Staff of the Senegalese army and a member of the ASSN, delivered the keynote address. Two panels, which included the editors and contributors, discussed the findings of the study, with particular emphasis on Security Sector Reform (SSR) processes in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. A lively exchange of ideas, analyses, experiences, and opinions ensued. Contributions from the floor enriched the debate on a wide range of subjects relevant to the specific challenges that Francophone West African countries face in contemplating or undertaking SSR, whether in post-conflict situations or in more stable, post-authoritarian environments.

ASSN MEMBER PROFILE

Missak Kassongo

In this issue of the ASSN Quarterly, we profile Missak Kassongo, a lawyer and Security Sector Reform (SSR) expert from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

A member of the ASSN since 2009, Missak's main specialisation is in the area of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), in which he has amassed a total of ten years experience. Beginning in 2002, he has carried out a considerable amount of research on small arms in Africa, spawning several publications on the proliferation of small arms and the human consequences in the DRC.

He has also researched on the prolific trafficking of small arms in the restive border areas of Uganda, South Sudan and his native DRC, conducted research on the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of national and foreign combatants in the DRC (2006-2007), and has participated in the reform of national legislation on the control of small arms in West and Central Africa. He is also involved in the formulation of policy frameworks aimed at regulating private security within Central African States.

Missak has a masters degree in Public International Law and International Relations from the University of Kinshasa and a Certificate in Security Sector Governance from the University of the Witwatersrand. He also trained as Trainer on SALW issues at Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Centre (KAIPTC) in Accra, Ghana.

He is currently a consultant to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) DRC on SALW and SSR, particularly police reform, and has undertaken various other consultancies including for Groupe de Recherche et d'Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité Internationale (GRIP), KAIPTC and Development Associates International (DAI).

Missak is proud of his membership in the ASSN, which he describes as "the best equipped indigenous network" in Africa in terms of professional expertise and experience.

"Being in the ASSN, I feel like I am in a family, a family with a vast wealth of knowledge and experience," he says. "Since I joined the ASSN in September 2009 I have been able to meet a large number of researchers, both African and non-African, working in the various disciplines in the study and practice of security in Africa."

The 34-year-old admires his ASSN colleagues for their willingness to share their skills and their keenness to inspire the younger generation of security and justice practitioners.

"My colleagues are very generous with their knowledge, experience, publications, analyses, research and information on opportunities for training. The spirit of sharing is just remarkable," Missak says.



THE KENYA DEFENCE FORCE IN SOMALIA The Need to Prepare for the Long Haul

By J.A.W. Kitiku & Johnstone Kibor

It is now over three months since the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) made a sudden entry into Somalia, with the aim of neutralising and ultimately eliminating Al Shabaab, an Al Qaeda-linked militia group that has been fighting for five years to depose Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG), itself a weak authority marooned in Mogadishu and only remaining in place due to the presence of a small African Union peacekeeping force.

For two decades, Kenya had consistently avoided any direct involvement in Somalia for strategic and geopolitical reasons. It has in the past declined to commit its forces to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).

According to the Kenyan government, its recent entry into Somalia was provoked by security threats perpetrated within its borders by Al Qaeda, citing the abductions of tourists and aid workers along the country's Coastal and North Eastern regions, as well as other sporadic incidents of insecurity attributed to Al Shabaab in some of the country's major urban centres, including the capital, Nairobi, and the key tourism hub and port city of Mombasa.

When the Kenya Defence Force mobilised to deal with Al-Shabaab militarily, the objective of the mission was to safeguard the country by driving the ragtag militia group from the proximity of Kenya's border with Somalia and eventually eradicate it.



There have however been reports that Kenya was, in fact, aiming to establish some sort of autonomous “buffer zone” immediately beyond its border with Somalia, a charge Nairobi denies. The fact of the matter, however, is that Kenya and the other countries in the region will not enjoy durable peace and security as long as Somalia remains unstable and lacks an effective government with the capacity to enforce the rule of law across the war-ravaged country.

When the military campaign began, the preponderant opinion among most Kenyans was that *Operation Linda Nchi*, as it is codenamed, was going to be a swift military engagement, probably lasting only a few weeks – after which the Kenyan troops would triumphantly return home after pulverising the enemy. On the contrary, the military operation for instance took longer than was expected to rout Al Shabaab from its major stronghold, the city of Kismayu.

Perhaps the strategy of the military operation, both in its planning and field command, is that the current phase of the operation is all about “disorganising” Al Shabaab and then gradually intensifying the attack to decimate and eventually eliminate it. Such “disorganisation” would most likely involve disabling Al Shabaab's capacity to plan, coordinate, and execute its activities. This would cause Al Shabaab commanders and fighters who survive the sustained assault to disintegrate and flee from their bases.

It should be noted that Al Shabaab is not the only security threat emanating from Somalia. Equally grave are the incidences of piracy off the Somali Coast, chiefly along the Gulf of Aden and targeting Indian Ocean shipping routes for the last three or so years. This has increasingly had serious security and economic implications for international maritime trade. It is believed that these pirate attacks have been Al Shabaab's economic lifeline.

Given this scenario, it is imperative to ensure that Somalia has a functioning government and that the rule of law is effectively established. Failure to achieve this would defeat the objectives of Kenya's entry into Somalia. Relaxing the current onslaught could embolden Al Shabaab. The militia could regroup or even mutate and take on another form and shape.

In order to succeed in this undertaking, AMISOM (which the KDF has now become part and parcel of), other regional countries and the international community must devise a common strategy aimed at eradicating Al Shabaab and the piracy problem, and installing a strong government in Somalia, with functioning state and security institutions, and all the operational capability. And this has to be done as soon as practically possible.

One thing should be clear however: there will be no quick-fix solution towards stabilising Somalia in particular and the region in general while Al Shabaab remains a threat. The KDF, AMISOM and every other party involved in the current military effort in Somalia should therefore be prepared to dig in for the long haul, and must simultaneously anticipate the attendant economic, political and social ramifications.

Lt-Col J.A.W. Kitiku is the Director of the Nairobi-based Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC). Johnstone Kibor is a Senior Researcher with the same organisation.

The Armed Conflict in Somalia

By Medhane Tadesse

A major development in Somalia in recent weeks is the deepening rift within the radical Islamist group Hara'kat Al-Shabaab, the AMISOM-supported military offensive in Mogadishu, pro-TFG (Transitional Federal Government) military operations by various clan forces in Bay and Bakol, Beletwein and Gedo regions.

This is compounded by a surprise entry of Kenyan forces into Somalia and the reengagement of Ethiopia in support of clan forces remotely allied to the TFG. These operations, still ongoing, have become possible mainly because most of the Al-Shabaab forces have increasingly become disorganised and disoriented mainly due to the military pressure from AMISOM and the confusion within the group's top leadership.

Fighting is still going on in many parts of Somalia between Al-Shabaab insurgents on the one hand and the TFG, TFG-allied militias, mainly linked to Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'i'a/ASWJ/, AMISOM, the Kenyan army and recently Ethiopian forces on the other hand. The fighting stretches from Dusamereb in Central Somalia all the way to the Kenyan border. Several administrations recently created by clan militias loosely allied to the TFG are fighting back against Al-Shabaab insurgents in several parts of Somalia including lower Shebelle, Lower Juba, Gedo and Bay and Bakol areas. Fighting between Al Shabaab and fighters loyal to Shebelle Valley administration is still going on in Hiran region.

Al Shabaab has waged a bloody five-year campaign to drive the largely impotent government (the TFG) from power. But in recent months it left most of its bases in the capital Mogadishu, where it continues to launch low level guerrilla-style attacks. Since June 2011 Al-Shabaab's military position has been greatly weakened due to both internal and external factors. Prominent among which is drought and famine, a loss of revenue from markets, the decline of financial support from external patrons, internal divisions and public disgust over their strict punishments, recruitment of child soldiers and indiscriminate bombing. It is also severely outgunned by AU forces.

The cracks within the fractured Somali Islamist camp are not only influenced by ideology and the recent rivalry and clashes have business and clan interests at its core. The main axis of the division is between Ali Zubeyr (recently replaced by Al Afghani) and a group of leaders represented by Mukhtar Robow. This is compounded by attempts to impose a totally foreign brand of Islam. There have always been cracks in Al-Shabaab's ideology, strategy as well as vision. We are probably witnessing a defining development.

Kenya's military operation in South-Central Somalia has piled more pressure on the militant group. On 16 October 2011, Kenya initiated military action against Al Shabaab, declaring self-defence. They made initial successes against the rebel group chasing them out of Elwak, Dhobley and Bulla Hawo. This is being reinforced by Ethiopia's re-entry in to the armed conflict in Somalia.

The Kenyan government has neither the financial clout nor the military knowhow to continue a protracted guerrilla war against an elusive and mobile enemy in an alien terrain. Ethiopian support has become critical. To date, the Kenyan intervention only shows little military advance. Unless supported by a strong Ethiopian push in Central Somalia, there is a possibility that Kenya's army would be bogged down. The idea is to squeeze Al-Shabaab fighters retreating from Mogadishu, Lower Juba and Gedo. Ethiopia is already supporting TFG allied militias in Gedo, Hiiraan and Galgudud but a new offensive on Bay and Bakol (Baidoa) is also imminent.

Although Ethiopia and Kenya have similar strategic objectives, they pursue different goals on how the buffer zones should be created. They share the same end set: the total defeat of Al-Shabaab. They share intelligence and coordinate military strategies, including joint planning and training, but they differ on how some regions in Somalia should be reconstituted. However, so far the result has been remarkable. The Islamist insurgents in Somalia are militarily on the defensive, if not in disarray. For the first time in years, Al-Shabaab was ousted from the capital Mogadishu following an offensive by African Union forces (AMISOM) and the TFG. This gave an enormous opportunity for the TFG to control the capital and promote stability in areas where Al-Shabaab had retreated from.

Events in Somalia are difficult to predict. But one thing is sure: the radical group Al-Shabaab is increasingly losing momentum. It may try hard to adjust to the internal crisis of the moment and move on, but the underlying causes of the problem will continue to grow, eating away at the cohesion and dynamism of the group. Most importantly, it is refreshing to see some degree of resolve and cooperation among countries in the sub-region. Unfortunately, the split among the Islamists does not automatically translate into an advantage for the TFG. The government is just too weak. Corruption is at its highest level and warlords and militias are creating mini-states to fill the void left by Al-Shabaab.

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Launching of 'Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector : ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians', Bamako, Mali, November 28-29, 2011

A regional parliamentary workshop on 'Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: Disseminating Best Practices in ECOWAS Member States', organised by the National Assembly of Mali, the Intern-Parliamentary Union (IPU), DCAF and ASSN was held in Bamako, Mali, on November 28-29.

This workshop is not dissimilar from the succession of Parliamentary workshops of this nature that ASSN and its partners have put together in the past, with one exception : the outdooring of the publication [Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians](#). The Guide is adapted from the earlier DCAF-IPU publication on parliamentary oversight and developed collaboratively by the ECOWAS Parliament and DCAF but authored largely by ASSN experts.

The adoption of *the Guide* (the first of its kind in Africa) is an important landmark in ECOWAS' on-again, off-again efforts to advance accountability of the sub-region's historically unruly and often politicised security institutions. ECOWAS, like the African Union, has a long history of concern about the state of security governance in the sub-region (albeit too often addressed through the rather narrow prism of prevention of 'coups' and 'illegal changes of government', rather than any clear conception of governance structures and processes in the security sector). This reaches at least as far back as the 2001 ECOWAS 'Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance', and, more recently, the ECOWAS *Code of Conduct for Armed Forces and Security Services of West Africa*, and the evolving Security Sector Governance (SSG) Component and 'Action Plan' of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF).

In terms of realising the principles and targets envisioned by the *Guide*, ECOWAS parliaments face at least three major challenges:

First, security governance within ECOWAS (as in Africa more generally) has largely defied the march of democratisation. Even though ECOWAS has focused almost obsessively on issues of security within the sub-region and its member states, governance of security remains in general opaque, exclusionary, and beyond the normal purview of organs of democratic oversight. 'Security' is still very much a presidential preserve in most cases. And while no longer as blatantly politicised, the security services nevertheless continue to be the mainstay of (albeit 'softer', civilianised) autocracies masquerading under the guise of electoral democracy, and all too often vectors of human rights abuses and violent conflict.

Secondly, and again in spite of ECOWAS' best efforts to foster a regional security regime, there has been little harmonisation of security doctrine and practice across the sub-region, with regional states remaining a mish-mash of idiosyncratic security arrangements, characterised by different security systems and historical legacies (Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone). In this light, the efforts of the Guide to establish a common [security] governance discourse and benchmarks seems (depending on one's perspective) either a hopeful opportunity or a premature effort.

Third, and more to the point, most ECOWAS (and African) parliaments have at best limited roles in security policy-and decision-making processes and oversight, especially in core areas like defence spending and intelligence, and very limited capacity to engage (even if the opportunity existed). A series of publications and needs assessments authored by DCAF and ASSN have underscored the challenges that confront ECOWAS parliaments. These include absence of a history and culture of security oversight and corresponding lack of clarity about the constitutional roles and powers of legislatures in this area; obsolete or inadequate security policy and legal frameworks, which undermine not only oversight but good management of the sector as a whole; lack of the necessary financial, administrative and analytical resources; weak institutional links with the armed forces and security services; a tradition of secrecy and executive dominance; self-censorship; excessive turn-over in membership of parliamentary security committees (particularly following elections); lack of gender balance in the membership of security and defence committees; and few links with other (non-statutory) institutions/actors of public oversight (civil society and media). Levels of security literacy among run-of-the-mill parliamentarians continue to be very low indeed.

All this is not necessarily unexpected, given that virtually all ECOWAS countries are emerging from conflict or an episode of militarisation, or both, contexts which make democratisation of SSG particularly challenging - and indeed in Bamako several parliamentarians were quite candid in admitting to these limitations. However, it does mean that the *Guide* (at least for the moment) remains very much an inspirational document. There is some legitimate scepticism that the *Guide* may represent nothing more than the latest chapter in a profusion of ECOWAS protocols and guidance norms and an equally long tradition of non-compliance and non-implementation by member-states. There is obviously some work to be done in connecting the dots within the ECOWAS structure itself. For instance, the ECOWAS Parliament, the key official sponsor of the *Guide*, does not have the necessary mandate in its articles to exercise security oversight (either in relation to the ECOWAS regional security complex or in relation to the security sectors of member states), even though extensively involved in conflict prevention and peace building initiatives in the sub-region. The *Guide* also appears to be very much a stand-alone document rather than part of a strategic vision or framework, such as would have been conferred by the SSG Component and Action Plan developed by the ECOWAS Commission, with which it presently enjoys no apparent linkages.

Nevertheless at the very least the *Guide* provides a framework (and set of benchmarks) for more purposive capacity-building work for Parliamentary Defence and Security Committees (PDSCs) - which have, in general, received very little local or international support, all the rhetoric about 'oversight' notwithstanding - and for collaboration between ECOWAS and various partners with an active interest in this issue, as well as a guidance, training and advocacy tool.

The workshop sought to concretise the discussion on the Guide around three issue areas in particular: the 'Politics of security sector oversight: making allies', 'Oversight of defence and security budgeting', and 'Gender-mainstreaming of security sector reform policies and programs'. Working group discussions were organised on Day 2 to further explore the issues raised in the presentations, and on the basis of these working groups a number of recommendations emerged.

These included :

- Building the capacity of parliamentarians and parliamentary staff in security sector oversight through participation in capacity-development workshops and seminars;
- Ensuring that the process for establishing and executing national budgets is transparent and provides guarantees against any misappropriation in the administration of public funds and resources;
- Assigning more powers and resources to parliamentary committees such as the defence and security and public accounts audit committees;
- Developing good working relationships with security sectors with mutual understandings on the issue of confidentiality in particular;
- Exchanging experiences and practices with parliamentarians from different countries;
- Actively engaging parliamentarians from other ECOWAS countries to learn from their experiences on integrating gender into security sector oversight; and
- Requesting briefings and training for parliamentarians and parliamentary staffers on gender issues, including as they relate to security sector oversight.

STATE BUILDING AND SECURITY SECTOR REFORM WITHIN THE MANO RIVER UNION The Case for a Sub-Regional Strategy for Sustained Peace and Security



By Peter F. Zaizay

Like much of postcolonial Africa, the Mano River Union (MRU) countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire have faced serious problems with their state-building, having suffered at least two decades of violent conflict and state fragility.

The MRU was established in 1973 to foster economic cooperation among its member countries, initially between Liberia and Sierra Leone and later incorporating Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire. But due to a series of civil wars and other forms of violent conflict within the sub region, the objectives of the Union have largely remained unachieved.

The period between 1989 and 2010 was particularly fraught. A conflict erupted in Liberia in 1989 and spilled over into Sierra Leone in 1991. This in turn precipitated a serious humanitarian crisis in Guinea and Cote d'Ivoire, with both sustaining considerable collateral damage from the two conflicts; eventually both countries were plunged into a cycle of profound destabilisation (a civil war in Cote d'Ivoire and a coup in Guinea). One of the legacies of this violent period is that it left the Mano River Basin awash with arms.

As a result, the MRU states generally remain fragile and unstable to date. The conflicts have undermined state building and stifled efforts towards sustainable development, while state-centric policies have on the other hand brought about the politicisation of the military.

A classic case point is Liberia, where problematic Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) continued to undermine peace and security and posed a broader threat to the MRU—mainly because the DDR and SSR approaches were not context-specific in their design and practice. For instance, a whole army with over 100 years of history was simply dismantled - without public consultation and contrary to the terms of the peace agreement - while thousands of youthful ex-fighters were excluded and left to fend for themselves.

Although Sierra Leone can be considered a relative SSR success story within the MRU, Guinea, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire still pose a challenge for peace and security in the sub region. The MRU is best placed to play a central role in fostering security reform within these countries, with the specific aim of securing and reconciling their societies and ridding them of exclusionary politics.

Calculated state-building is an indispensable element for any country that hopes to overcome national fragility. This is especially true for countries that experience frequent armed conflicts underpinned by chronic poverty. In such situations, state-building should aim at enhancing both the capacity and legitimacy of the state, while instituting a system of effective and democratically governed security for its citizens. This can be achieved through context-driven SSR, which has over the years come to be recognised as a crucial element for successful post-conflict state-building.

It is easy for one to conclude that the number of armed conflicts is on the decline simply because we happen to live in the 21st Century. The reality, however, is that the risk of recurrent conflict remains high, often as a reflection of incomplete state-building processes in post-conflict environments or in societies where reforms do not aim at reconciliation, but rather foster impunity for the elite and punishment for the downtrodden masses, who often constitute the foot soldiers in situations of actual conflict.

The MRU – with expert assistance from an institution with an African-centred SSR approach such as the African Security Sector Network (ASSN)- can leverage the attainment of genuine democratic states with people-centred agendas among its member countries, by particularly drawing lessons from success stories in post-conflict DDR, transitional justice and SSR. These examples can be found both in Africa and beyond, with emphasis on countries that have successfully united their divided societies by placing reconciliation at the heart of their reform programme.

Considering the many security problems facing the MRU countries, including the rampant politicisation of the military, threats of future military coups and the implications of strained relations with former colonial powers, there is an urgent need for a sub regional SSR Strategy to help safeguard the democratic gains that have been made and to reduce the collective fragility of the MRU states.

Attention should also focus on trans-border issues that threaten the lives and wellbeing of ordinary people, such as mercenarism, organised crime, money laundering and terrorism, with the targeted results being conflict prevention, state-building and the fostering of trans-border security within the sub region.

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Explaining Organisational Behaviour in the South African Intelligence Services



By *Sandy Africa**

The recent appointment of Dennis Dlomo as interim head of South Africa's fledgling State Security Agency would be more welcome if it was not taking place under such disconcerting circumstances.[1] Some media reports suggest that the latest turmoil in South Africa's civilian intelligence service is an indication that the agency is a pawn in the sphere of politics. But the turbulence in South Africa's intelligence structures could possibly be explained by what in management sciences is referred to as the "upper echelons theory". The upper echelons perspective was best articulated by Hambrick and Mason in a 1984 article in which they argue that organisational outcomes and performance are a reflection of the consciousness, values and behaviours of the most powerful actors in an organisation, namely its top management.[2] Several writers have since gone on to elaborate on this notion, claiming that there is a strong connection between top management consciousness, values and behaviour on the one hand, and organisational performance on the other.[3]

The upper echelons theory is important because top management matters, especially when it comes to organisational renewal and decision-making, both highly relevant factors in the case of South African intelligence. Granted, there is an argument that the role of top management may be exaggerated, and that the rank-and-file members are probably more important in shaping organisational values, culture and behaviour.[4] But in trying to make sense of the dynamics of intelligence services, the traditionally hierarchical structure and decision-making processes, compartmentalisation of activity, and limited access to information are factors which make the upper echelons perspective worth considering.

In an eleven-year longitudinal study of the 45 largest corporations in the Netherlands, Glunk and Heiltjes (2003) observed that changes in top management teams are becoming 'more and more frequent due to poor organisational performance, mergers and acquisitions, and strategic reorientations'. [5] In fact, they argue, such regular changes reflect a 'desire to influence the performance of the firm by means of altering the composition of the top management team'. Taking into account the conditions surrounding the creation of South Africa's new State Security Agency, these observations seem generalisable. In 2009 Dr Siyabonga Cwele, the newly appointed Minister for State Security (previously known as the Minister for Intelligence Services), promised to undertake a streamlining of the intelligence services through the creation of a new Agency.[6] A leadership team to assist the Minister in implementing this strategic realignment was announced a few months later. At the time, media commentators expressed concern that the reputedly experienced team (Director-General Jeff Maqetuka, South African Secret Service head Moe Shaik, and National Intelligence Agency head Gibson Njenje) – all of whom had retired some time earlier from intelligence to pursue other careers – were loyalists of the President, Jacob Zuma. It was argued that they could use their positions to further a partisan political agenda, given that they were predisposed to the President.

No one anticipated the problem that actually did emerge: a state of paralysis in which the Minister and his top executives failed to work as an effective team. The media has been rife with speculation about the differences between the Minister and the three, but there has been no official comment and therefore little information upon which to authoritatively evaluate the state of affairs. Suffice it to say that there seems to have been insufficient chemistry and trust between the Minister and the three, who from media accounts are gravitating towards separate agreements with the Minister that they will not serve out their full three year contracts. What was supposed to have been a blessing – fresh leadership, imbued with years of experience and a shared vision with the new administration – has turned out to be something of a curse.

Why has it not been possible to translate the potential benefits of bringing in such experienced top management leadership, into a trajectory of enhanced performance? The common sense view is that an experienced top management is a desirable and performance-enhancing asset for any organisation. Glunk and Heiltjes (2003) point to two other perspectives on the impact of changes in top management, however. These are:

- 1) A 'vicious circle theory' that argues that top management successions are in fact not good for organisations, and promote instability and ambiguity, leading to lower organisational performance; and
- 2) A theory which holds that changes at the top of an organisation are often merely symbolic, and that a new CEO or changes to a top management team will only marginally affect the performance of the organisation.[7]

Certainly, of the three perspectives, the latter two seem to better explain the outcome of the recent top three senior management appointments to the State Security Agency. The policy agenda of the Minister is clearly set out in his 2010 budget vote address. The Minister undertook to complete the reorganisation of the Agency 'swiftly and without disruptions' and set out as following goals for that budget year the tabling of the National State Security Bill to effect the amalgamation of the various intelligence components into a single entity; redeployment of members into new structures and upgrading of their skills to ensure that the agency has adequate human capital to meet the new challenges; integrating technology platforms and playing a more proactive leadership role in developing policy, setting security standards and monitoring for compliance.[8]

With such an ambitious agenda, there should have been focus, urgency and singularity of purpose between the Minister and his top team. The appointment of the experienced senior officials, however, seemed troubled from the start. There was confusion and concern about which instrument had legal precedence – the presidential Proclamation which had established the State Security Agency, or the yet to be repealed Intelligence Services Act. The slow pace at which legislation to formalise the creation of the State Security Agency's was processed exacerbated the tensions. By the time of the Minister's 2011 budget vote, there still had been no tabling of legislation, even though the restructuring process was underway. Much of the Minister's energy has been consumed instead, by efforts to get the controversial Protection of State Information Bill passed.

Political survival and career advancement requires of cabinet ministers that they make an impact in the short space of time that they may be in office. Top management teams appointed to lead an organisation also want to make an impression, and their way of achieving this is by demonstrating innovative and efficient ways of managing the organisation's affairs.

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Opinion Piece

There is a school of thought that holds that real power rests with the bureaucracy because it is stable and vested with a technical expertise which politicians, who usually serve for short terms, usually lack. In this case, the Minister had been in his position for several months – in contrast to the interrupted service records of the three. Moreover, he had served as chairperson of the parliamentary oversight committee on intelligence prior to becoming a cabinet minister, and was therefore quite familiar with the services. The fact that Minister Cwele has outrun and outlasted his officials, speaks much of where power and influence reside in the South African political milieu. In upper echelons theory logic, the Minister occupies an even higher echelon of influence, and it is his consciousness, values and behaviour which have shaped the organisation, its strategic direction and performance. In fact, this raises the question, also addressed in segments of the upper echelons literature on who constitutes the dominant coalition in strategic decision making.[9] Assumptions usually made about top management teams is that they are relatively powerful, and that their choices will have the greatest impact on organisational policy and strategy. In fact, management theory reminds us that the formal top management team may not be the dominant coalition in an organisation, and that a wider range of networks and influential actors whose impact on decision-making goes belies their positioning in the organisational hierarchy.

It could not have been the new administration's intention to spark a vicious circle of uncertainty and ambiguity when the new top management team was appointed: such a manoeuvre would have been counterproductive and risky in the world of intelligence where timeliness and effectiveness are everything. But it would have required an unlikely subservience, once differences became apparent, for the relationship to have worked if the three were denied the space to make a difference. With that trait not forthcoming, the stage was set for a fractious relationship instead. It is quite possible that it was never intended or foreseen that the top three would so energetically steer the organisation in a direction at odds with that of the Minister. Perhaps their appointment was merely intended to be a symbolic reflection that there was a new administration in town.

Hypothetically speaking, what are the conditions under which a more favourable result – a positive working relationship between the Minister and his top officials - might have been achieved? The answer to this question might well lie in the organisation's past. What characterised the early years of the post-apartheid intelligence dispensation was the longevity of tenure of its top management team. This was an era of relative stability in the top management structures, notwithstanding the paradigm shift that a change in purpose would have meant. Politically, negotiations for the intelligence dispensation were led by veteran ANC leader, Joe Nhlanhla, who went on to serve in two administrations (Nelson Mandela's and Thabo Mbeki's) as Deputy Minister and Minister for Intelligence Services. In all, Nhlanhla had almost ten years to craft and implement his vision, subjecting his top officials to an authority that comes with long tenure, a luxury no subsequent Minister has enjoyed. Ministers Lindiwe Sisulu and Ronnie Kasrils each served only a term (or part thereof), and it remains to be seen if current incumbent Siyabonga Cwele will be afforded the luxury of time that stood Nhlanhla in good stead.

Apart from not having time on his side, Cwele is functioning within a legal framework and operational guidelines whose shortcomings have been exposed through several scandals. A Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence Report of 2007 argued the need to strike a balance between the powers of officials and the Executive.[10] But the Commission did not comment on what to do in the event of conflict between these centres of influence. The role of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI), South Africa's parliamentary oversight body, does not extend to intervening in conflicts between Ministers and their officials. Neither does that of the Inspector-General for Intelligence. In South Africa, the most senior public servants are usually appointed at by the Executive. The three in this case were all appointed as Directors-General by the President, on contract. The fact that their appointments were not permanent also made their influence somewhat tenuous.

Dlomo's appointment could augur well for the much slowed down reform (or transformation) process. On his return from his CISSA posting last year, he served as an advisor to the Minister, and played a prominent role in panel-beating the Protection of Information Bill into a shape that has made it more palatable to the opposition in Parliament (the absence of a public interest defence clause and draconian penalties for possession of classified material remain sticking points). He has reportedly advised the Minister on a legislative formula to fast track the formalisation of the State Security Agency. But whether this will be enough to restore confidence in the intelligence services, and to see them recover to their former status as a model of Security Sector Transformation (SST), remains to be seen. The three perspectives relating to changes in top management may help us to answer the question: Will the appointment result in a marked improvement in the implementation of the State Security Agency's programme; will it descend the organisation into further chaos; or is it merely symbolic, and if so, of what?

The leadership saga has been a drain on the morale of South African intelligence officers if media reports are anything to go by. Ideally, the common sense perspective – talented top management leads to increased performance – should prevail. A fresh look at how to appoint experienced and competent senior managers and to put them to good use calls for a shift in paradigm. Both the executive and the recruited talent need to understand the boundaries as they agree to work together. The lesson to be learned from this episode is that the promise of invigoration and enhanced associated with top management changes, do not take place in a power vacuum. The role of senior management in highly hierarchical structures, such as intelligence services, is mediated by the formal authority provided by the legal framework, and by the informal medium through which power and control are exercised.

[1] Dlomo, an active member of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) and former Executive Director of CISSA, was appointed acting Director-General of the State Security Agency, after the incumbent, Jeff Maquetuka was given long leave months before the expiry of his contract.

[2] Hambrick, D & Mason, P. "The organisation as a reflection of its Top Managers". *Academy of Management Review*, Vol.9, No.2 (April 1984), pp 193-206.

[3] A comprehensive survey of research done on this topic was conducted and published in Carpenter, M., Geletkanycz, M. & Sanders, WM. "Upper echelons research revisited: Antecedents, Elements, and Consequences of Top Management Team Composition". *Journal of Management*. 2004 30(6). Pp.749-778.

[4] See "The organisation as a Reflection of its Followership: Servant Leadership as a Model for Leading in the Upper Echelons". 2008. School of Global Leadership and Entrepreneurship, Regent University.

[5] Glunk, U. & Heiltjes, M. 2003. "Changes in the Top Management Team: performance implications of altering team composition." Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Innovation.

[6] The State Security Agency was established by Presidential Proclamation in 2009. It centralised the hitherto separate civilian intelligence agencies (including the National Intelligence Agency, the South African Secret Service, the South African National Academy of Intelligence and the COMSEC Ltd), under one overall administrative head.

[7] Glunk and Heiltjes expand briefly on these viewpoints in their article cited above.

[8] Address by the Minister of State Security, Dr SC cwele on the occasion of the State Security Budget Vote, Parliament, Cape Town.. 5 May 2010.

[9] Carpenter et al (op.cit), cite the influential work of Cyert & March.. 1963 A behavioural theory of the firm. Engelwood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

[10] Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence. Intelligence in a democracy. Final report of the Ministerial Review Commission on Intelligence to the Minister for Intelligence Services. September 2008.

SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS AND CITIZEN SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA Challenges to Reform

By Lucia Dammert & Claudia Fuentes

INTRODUCTION

This paper provides an overview of the main security challenges affecting the people and governments of Latin America today and makes a number of recommendations designed to strengthen the Security Sector Reforms (SSR) launched in the region with the advent of democratisation, and based on a broad survey of the region's security sectors. It starts by explaining the political and economic context of the reforms with a particular emphasis on two major challenges: inequality and violence.

1. Context of Reform: Inequality and Violence

Latin America is characterised by a high degree of social, political and cultural heterogeneity depending on the specific sub-region, country or population. This diversity generates a wide range of security problems in the region which has, in turn, generated very different type of responses. Effectively assessing the different reforms in the security sector requires an evaluation of the specificities of each particular national context, yet it is still possible to highlight some of the more severe and widespread threats that affect the human rights of Latin American people and place at risk the life and wellbeing of a vast majority in the region. Understanding the current security problems in Latin America, including the political and economic weakness that generate and sustain them, is a fundamental starting point to evaluate the extent of the institutional reforms taking place in the security sector.

As indicated by the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights and UNDP-Costa Rica, [1] international reports [2] on Latin America agree that the two major challenges in the region concern inequality and violence. Indeed, no region of the world has more inequality than Latin America nor does any have a higher level of criminal violence." According to the Human Development Report for Latin America and the Caribbean, 10 out of the 15 countries with the highest levels of inequality are in the region (UNDP, 2010). Inequality in Latin America is not only expressed by the gap between the rich and the poor, it is also a result of the lack of political representation and the marginalisation of vast sectors of the population including women, indigenous populations and Afro-descendants. Yet, poverty remains one of the main challenges to overcome these high levels of inequality. According to ECLAC estimates, 12.9% of the population in Latin America (some 71 million people) lived in extreme poverty in 2008. This group is part of a broader group of the poor whose incomes are insufficient to purchase their basic needs, including both food and non-food items, and which represents 33% of the population of the region, that is, 180 million people (ECLAC, 2010). Countries with medium to high levels of extreme poverty include Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador and Guatemala, with levels between 19% and 29%, while the countries with the highest rates (over 30%) are Bolivia, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay (ECLAC, 2010).

The lack of personal security as a result of criminal violence is probably the first concern of Latin American people today. As a result, strengthening citizen security became a fundamental objective for regional institutions and national governments that are not only concerned about the lives of hundreds of citizens but for the consequences of a situation that poses a direct threat to the integrity of the state and the democratic institutions in our region. The magnitude of the problem is clearer when looking at homicide rates in the region in comparative perspective. According to OAS, murders in our region are twice the world average and in some parts, are five times higher. Some countries have the highest homicide rates in the world. Latin America and the Caribbean account for 42% of worldwide homicides committed using firearms and for 66% of all kidnappings, even though the region only has 8% of the world's population (OAS, 2008). Other reports indicate that each year some 200 million persons in Latin America and the Caribbean—a third of the population—are victims, directly or in the nuclear family, of some criminal activity. During the first decade of this century, more than 1.2 million Latin Americans lost their lives due to criminal violence, most of it tied to transnational criminal activities (UNDP/OAS, 2010).

The rising level of crime and violence is linked to the consumption and trafficking of drugs and, in general, with organised criminal activities. The associated financial flows are also enormous. For example, the OAS report on public security states that the majority of the illicit drugs that are trafficked worldwide are grown and processed in the Andean countries. According to the same report, drug trafficking generates income of around \$320 billion a year, a figure that exceeds the GDP of many Western Hemisphere countries (OAS 2008:16).

Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the dire state of citizen security today is also the result of widespread and multiple institutional and political weaknesses that affect many countries of the region. As the UNDP/ OAS study indicates, state weakness helps to explain why narco-crime controls territories and influences public decisions and it also one the reasons behind substantial 'ungoverned spaces' beyond the reach of the law. One area in which this is more evident is the justice system whose institutional weaknesses hinder the efficacy of crime and violence punishment and prevention.

2. The Concept of Security in Latin America

In Latin America, the traditional security agenda is focused on the protection of the state and its borders and it fundamentally based on the use military instruments to solve security problems. While this traditional agenda still predominates in the thinking of governments across the region (despite the lack of inter-state conflicts) a more multidimensional security agenda encompassing a focus on human security is slowly gaining greater prominence. In October 2003 the "Declaration on Security in the Americas" was adopted in October 2003 by the OAS Special Conference in Mexico, itself representing the culmination of more than decade of dialogue on new approaches concerning hemispheric security. The multidimensional security concept included in the declaration considers non-traditional threats like intra-state insurgencies; drug-trafficking; terrorism; illegal migration; health risks; natural disasters, violation of human rights; extreme poverty and inequality; smuggling of goods; trafficking of arms; trafficking in persons; among others.

It also indicates that many of these new challenges to hemispheric security are transnational in nature and may require appropriate hemispheric cooperation, for instance, through implementation of the obligations assumed by the states in international agreements.



Lucia Dammert, co-author of this paper.

Policy Note

The increasing levels of crime and violence in the region in combination with high levels of economic and social inequalities revitalised the necessity to formulate a security concept focusing on the security of people. During the last decade of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s many regional organisations and think tanks started to use the concept of human security as a way of better capturing the Latin American vulnerabilities in this area. In general, Latin American scholars and policy-makers have been especially supportive of the narrow definition of human security understood as “freedom from fear”. As a specific modality of human security, the concept of citizen security has also gained greater prominence in Latin America because it stresses the protection specifically against violent or predatory crime. However, a shared understanding of a security framework along with a set of policy options and instruments that are akin to this approach in the countries across the region is yet to emerge.

Efforts to develop a common security concept are further complicated by how many Latin American governments are responding to their domestic and transnational security problems. There is increasing public pressure to use the armed forces to assist the police in combating crime, drugs, and other threats to internal security. The emergent militarisation of security issues in Latin America has pulled the debate back to the traditional security agenda.[3] This is further complicated by the role of the United States in the region - especially since 9/11 - which also shapes how countries respond to security problems. This is most evident with the security threats arising from organised crime and trafficking in drugs where the US has generally favoured militarised responses.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

A survey of security sectors in Latin America and the Caribbean conducted by FLACSO [4] advanced a number of recommendations on reform initiatives that would respond to current challenges to citizen security in the region. Some of these are summarised below:

1. Security Sector

· *Policy coordination.* Broad policy frameworks should be developed for the security sector that recognise both the interdependency and functional specificity of the agencies (Defence, Public Security, Intelligence, etc) in the sector;

· *Strengthen levels of professionalism across the security sector;*

· *Comprehensive and specific reforms.* Similarly, comprehensive reforms must go hand-in-hand with a recognition of the specific needs and challenges of each institution; at the same time, clear distinctions in the mandates of military, police and intelligence agencies should go hand-in-hand with capacity for joint operations, which must be time-bound, with the roles and responsibilities of each player clearly specified;

· *Delimit and specify the functions of the armed forces in internal security:* There is a tendency across the region to militarisation of internal security and crime-control, rationalised on the basis of inadequate police capacity. Military participation in public security should not become common practice or a permanent feature, and where it occurs, strict parameters should be established to regulate the actions of soldiers, along with exit strategies and time-lines. Responding to violent crime requires both strengthening the police and re-educating and re-equipping military forces to prepare them for this (exceptional and temporary) domestic role;

· *Greater national and regional security coordination* (including permanent inter-governmental coordination mechanisms) is necessary, in recognition of the cross-cutting and cross-border nature of most contemporary security threats;

· *Institutionalise evaluation and monitoring mechanisms in the security sector* (including national studies and research) to track and assess policy impacts and expenditure outcomes on behalf of the civil authorities;

· *Design and implement accountability systems.* Establishment of effective systems of public oversight and accountability is imperative, given the high levels of autonomy enjoyed by security institutions in the region;

· *Strengthening the tracking, monitoring, supervisory roles and capabilities of national legislatures* is a particular priority (for instance through better access to civilian experts and other support mechanisms), reinforced by broader involvement of civil society;

· *Strengthen civilian expertise* in research, analysis, and administration, both within line ministries in the security sector, and in think-tanks and higher educational institutions. Limited (or non-existent) civilian expertise has sustained a situation where security policy initiatives and debate are monopolised by members of the armed forces, police and intelligence services;

· *Establish transparency and 'contestability' around defence, police and intelligence budgets,* and enhance the capability of finance ministries and state budget organs to correctly assess and monitor budget proposals, expenditures and procurement.

2. Defence Sub-Sector

· *Clearly specify missions and functions of the armed forces.* In a context of military role expansion into both developmental and internal policing tasks, often in an ad-hoc fashion, there is a need to debate and more clearly specify (or rethink) military roles and functions, including emergency deployments, in a more integral and long-term manner;

· *Strengthen institutional capacities of Defence Ministries and their (expert) civilian staff,* especially with regard to policy design and planning (Defence Ministries in the region are still weak relative to the armed forces);

· *Develop tools and institutional capability for democratic civil command* more broadly, particularly in areas such as military justice, education/military training, and budgetary and procurement processes, where civilian influence has traditionally been limited;

· *Develop mechanisms for budget monitoring* by respective ministries, the Ministry of Finance (or Treasury) and specialised Parliamentary commissions.

3. Public Security Sub-Sector

· *Improve Police professionalism and accountability.* Create conditions that minimise police corruption and politicisation, and enhance overall police effectiveness and accountability, by addressing the factors that militate against police performance (recruitment and training), as well as the many internal problems of policing institutions that render a career in policing unattractive;

· *Improve capacity for civilian democratic leadership.* Design and supervision of public security policies should be the responsibility of civilian officials and leaders whose decisions are in turn subject to review and evaluation, say, via citizen audits or national councils of public security with a wide representation;

· *Promote Community and 'local-needs' policing* that responds to citizen security and public safety imperatives rather than prioritising 'law-enforcement' and 'public order';

· *Strengthen the regulation of private security services;* and

· *Regulate police participation in private security services.*

4. Intelligence Sub-Sector

· *Recognise the intelligence services as an integral part of public policy and democratic discourse, with transparent and well defined responsibilities and necessary mechanisms for accountability.* Even with the best institutional architecture, the intelligence system may not achieve its aims if civil society and democratic institutions do not pay close attention to it;

· *Clarify legitimate principles, goals and methods of intelligence and intelligence services.* It is not enough to suppose that professional norms are sufficient to ensure appropriate functioning of intelligence dispensations. There must be a framework of law which regulates intelligence, defines its legitimate ends and modus operandi, and thus reconciles national security objectives with respect for the rights of citizens;

· *Institute more effective Legislative monitoring and oversight of Intelligence Agencies;*

· *Establish inter-agency mechanisms for coordination and assessment of intelligence activities and products,* along with a clear and transparent civilian command and control of intelligence within the Presidency and other intelligence nerve centres;

· *Develop a professional code of conduct for intelligence operatives and employees,* along with a codification of professional protections and guarantees for intelligence personnel to prevent politicisation and abuse.

[1] Since 2010, these two institutions are working on a project to assess human security challenges in Latin America. See: <http://www.iidh.ed.cr/multic/defaultiidhSeguridadEN.aspx?Portal=IIDHSeguridadEN>

[2] These include: Report on the advances in the region toward the Millennium Development Goals -ECLAC (2010)-, human development -UNDP (2010)-, the Hemispheric Agenda to achieve Decent Work in the Americas -ILO (2010)- and the advance of democracies -UNDP/OAS (2010).

[3] Lucia Dammert and John Bailey, *Militarización de la seguridad pública en América Latina?*, Foreign Affairs en Español. Vol. 7, n. 2, 2007


[4] See FLACSO, *Security Sector Report: Latin America and the Caribbean*. Santiago: FLACSO, 2007.

BOOK REVIEW

'Women and Security Governance in Africa' by 'Funmi Olonisakin and Awino Okech (eds)

'Funmi Olonisakin and Awino Okech (eds.) Women and Security Governance in Africa, Cape Town/Dakar/Nairobi/Oxford: Pambazuka Press, 2011

Reviewed by Justina Dugbah



This edited collection represents a major intellectual contribution in the field of international security in general and African security governance in particular. The broader focus of the book is the role and place of women in security governance in the African context. It deals with a range of thematic issues, and national case studies, thereby making an important contribution to recent debates around the meaning, nature and focus of 'security'. While these debates have rightly resulted in rethinking traditional state-centric concepts of security to a broader approach culminating in the 'human security' discourse, there have been concerns about the continuing neglect and marginalisation of key actors and issues in the new security discourse. In particular, within the field of international security, the tendency to relegate the security challenges faced by women, children and other vulnerable groups to the margins has attracted increasing critical scholarly attention. Within this context *Women and Security Governance in Africa* is a timely contribution aimed at not only filling a critical void in the current literature, but more significantly as a welcome effort at broadening our understanding of emerging trends and issues in African security governance.

The main thrust of the book is that while human security has gained world-wide acceptance in the post-Cold War era, and with the African region, given its peculiar security challenges, providing the needed setting for analysing emerging challenges and trends in the new security discourse, the discussion of the role of women in peace and security has not been given the deserved attention, either in the scholarly literature or in policy circles. Thus in seeking to merge this void between the new security discourse and the marginalisation of women in the new discourse, the book draws on the varying contexts in Africa to critique the existing discourse and to propose more alternative narratives that truly reflect the security needs of majority of African people. The book argues that such narratives, with a particular focus on women's security, are particularly significant because they point to fundamental gaps not only in the security framework of African states and regional security institutions, but also because understanding them offers a fresh and novel pathway towards more inclusive security governance architecture.

A key strength of the book is the ability to blend and weave together a variety of approaches and perspectives with remarkable ease and clarity, while maintaining a high level of intellectual rigour and sophistication. Demonstrating the distinct and remarkable infusion of theoretical/conceptual analysis and the empirical, the book addresses four thematic issues: (a) security as a contextual and gendered concept; (b) structures of security governance at the regional level; (c) security governance and reform in post-conflict environments; (d) transnational justice and its intersection with security governance. These thematic issues frame the book's eight chapters, which are in turn grouped into three parts, each with a specific broad focus.

The first part provides a conceptual understanding of security governance within three frameworks, including the location of security governance as an involving discourse within the domain of international relations and national or state security arrangements; transitional justice processes as a zone within which security sector reform projects across the African continent have been undertaken; and feminist critique of security governance, locating the role of women in the African state and examining the centrality of body politics as an inroad to understanding insecurity. Part two of the book focuses on country-specific case studies highlighting the involvement of African women in conflict and post-conflict processes. What emerges from these country-case studies is the inescapable fact that in any given conflict and post-conflict environment, women's security concerns are unavoidably linked with the quest for justice and to seek redress for war crimes. Thus, there is the need to put in place processes and structures of transitional justice which are inclusive and takes into consideration the gendered nature of conflicts. In part three of the book, attention is focused on the regional context for security governance with particular reference to specific regional initiatives. Given the increasing role of regional institutions in conflict and post-conflict situations, the book closely examines the security governance infrastructure of key regional bodies such as the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States, which offer important lessons in terms of best practices, short-comings and the way forward.

As indicated earlier, the book constitutes a major contribution to recent intellectual and policy debates and discussions around security governance in a variety of national and regional contexts. While most of such debates and discussions have focused on the deployment of the concept of human security in confronting the security challenges presented by a post-Cold War environment, the uncritical deployment of normative ideas such as human security without appropriate consideration for specific national and regional contexts have resulted in lack of adequate policy prescriptions and the most desirable policy outcomes. Second, while the human security discourse has attracted considerable attention and has received support from a wide-range of stakeholders, failure to integrate gender and specifically women's security considerations has alienated the needs and concerns of majority of the victims of violent conflicts. From the foregoing therefore, the greatest contribution of *Women and Security Governance in Africa* is its ability to successfully bridge the gap between the normative ideals of 'human security' and the incorporation of women's security consideration, while highlighting the peculiar challenges of security governance in different national contexts and within the African region.

One of the challenges to security governance within the African region which has been identified by the book is the influence and the role of the international community in conflict and post-conflict arrangements and processes within the African region. While there is no denying the fact that most conflict and post-conflict arrangements will be unsuccessfully without donor support, it equally raises the question of 'ownership' of these arrangements and processes. Thus one missing link in the book is the failure to include a detailed analysis and discussion on the broader international security governance architecture and how the enforcement of normative ideas such as 'human security', 'human rights', 'responsibility to protect', etc by transnational or supranational bodies such as the United Nations could undermine efforts at creating and institutionalising home-grown African oriented security governance initiatives. In other words, how does African security governance fit into the global security governance architecture? Given the present reliance by security governance initiatives at both national and regional level on international support or donor assistance and given the role and influence of foreign interests in many of Africa's most bloody and protracted conflicts, can there be a true realisation of the ideals of human security and transitional justice under such circumstances. Finally, in advocating for the integration of women's security issues and experiences into security governance in Africa, it is equally important to be mindful of different experiences of women in conflict situations and how some of these experiences and invariably, access to remedial measures are mediated by a wide-range of socio-cultural factors. Overall, this book demonstrates a highly laudable command and application of several literatures, indeed an impressive command of normative political theory, gender and public policy.

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Layout and design by Philip Emase.