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REPORT

ECOWAS Security Sector Reform & Governance Training Workshop

Le Ndiambour Hôtel et Résidence
Dakar, Senegal



14th - 16th March 2022



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Group Photo: ECOWAS SSRG Training Workshop, Dakar, 14th March 2022

Capacity Development of Stakeholders and institutions in the Security Sector and Relevant Oversight Realms.



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African Security Sector Network (ASSN)

Formed in 2003, the **African Security Sector Network (ASSN)**, headquartered in Accra (Ghana), is a pan-African network of practitioners and organizations working to promote effective and democratically governed security sectors across Africa.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

| | |
|--------------------|---|
| AJS | Association of Lawyers of Senegal |
| APS | Senegal Press Agency |
| ASSN | African Security Sector Network - Réseau Africain du Secteur de Sécurité |
| CCDG | ECOWAS Centre for Gender Development |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| CHEDS | Centre for Advanced Studies in Defence and Security |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| DCAF | Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance |
| EPSAO | Peace and security architecture and operations - Architecture et opérations de paix et sécurité |
| FAFS | Federation of Women's Associations of Senegal |
| DSF | Defence and security forces |
| GIZ | German Development Cooperation Agency |
| SSGR | Security Sector Governance and Reform |
| GTFJPS | Women, Youth, Peace and Security Working Group in West Africa and the Sahel |
| LSDH | Senegalese League for Human Rights |
| LEGS Africa | Leadership, Ethics, Governance, Strategy - Africa |
| NSC | National security council - Conseil national de sécurité |
| UN | United Nations |
| RADDHO | African meeting for the defense of human rights |
| RESPFECO | Peace and Security Network for women in the ECOWAS region |
| SSR | Security sector reform |
| AU | African Union |
| EU | European Union |
| UNOWAS | United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel |
| WATHI | West African think tank |



INTRODUCTION

1. Within the framework of the implementation of the ECOWAS Peace and Security Architecture and Operations (EPSAO) Project, the Regional Security Division, the Department of Political Affairs, the ECOWAS Peace and Security Commission, in collaboration with the African Security Sector Network (ASSN) and the GIZ-EPSAO Project, with the support of the European Union Commission and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), organized a training workshop on ECOWAS Security Sector Reform and Governance (SSRG) from March 14 to March 16, 2022, in Dakar, Senegal. The workshop is part of the pilot SSRG trainings in Member States since the adoption of the ECOWAS SSRG policy framework by the Authority of Heads of State and Government in Dakar, Senegal in June 2016.

2. The main objective of the 3-day training in Member States is to facilitate the dissemination and promote awareness of the ECOWAS Policy Framework on SSRG, as mandated by the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government. More specifically, the objectives are as follows:

- a) To improve stakeholders' appreciation of the importance and value of the SSRG by introducing the key provisions and principles of the ECOWAS Policy Framework on SSRG;
- b) To promote a common vision and understanding of SSRG among national security stakeholders, including policy makers, legislators, oversight bodies, senior security practitioners and civil society;
- c) To enhance SSRG institution and capacity building in a way that strengthens national ownership, national responsibility and national action for reform;
- d) To improve the efficiency, professionalism, accountability and responsiveness of the security services to the needs of the population; and
- e) To integrate the gender dimension in the SSRG and promote the role of women and youth in peace and security.

3. The expected outcomes of the workshop were :

- a) A better understanding of the key principles and essential elements of SSRG, and the value of SSRG in promoting conflict prevention and strengthening democratic governance;
- b) Strengthening national appropriation, national responsibility and national commitment to SSRG;
- c) Improve capacity of national stakeholders to clearly define a national security vision and to lead national SSR efforts;
- d) Strengthening coherence and coordination of SSRG efforts among national stakeholders and security institutions; and
- e) Strengthening the role of women and youth in the planning, delivery, management and monitoring of peace and security.

4. This training workshop brought together all stakeholders and specialists in security issues from civil society, the state, departments and agencies involved in the security sector. These included :



National institutions

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Ministry of the Armed Forces
- Ministry of the Interior
- Ministry of Economy, Planning and Cooperation
- National Assembly
- Ombudsman of the Republic
- State Inspectorate General
- National Fire Brigade
- Directorate General for Territorial Administration
- Directorate of Civil Protection
- Directorate General of the National Police
- National Gendarmerie
- Directorate General of Territorial Administration
- Directorate of Planning and Economic Studies
- Prison Administration
- Directorate of National Intelligence
- Directorate of Criminal Affairs and Pardons

CSOs

- Peace and Security Network for Women in the ECOWAS region - REPSFECO
- *West African Think tank* - WATHI
- Leadership, Ethics, Governance, Strategy Africa - LEGS Africa
- Association of Senegalese Lawyers - AJS
- Siggil Jigeen Network
- Consortium of Development NGOs - CONGAD
- *Social change factory*
- Senegalese Institute for Human Rights
- Working Group on Women, Youth, Peace and Security in West Africa and the Sahel -GTFJSP

International institutions and partners

- Delegation of the European Union to Senegal
- African Union
- ECOWAS Coordination Office
- United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel - UNOWAS

Press

- Senegalese News Agency
- Dakaractu
- Association of Sahel Journalists for the prevention of violent extremism

Other institutions

- Centre for Advanced Studies in Defence and Security - CHEDS
- Senegalese Bar Association



DAY ONE

Opening Ceremony

1. The workshop began with an opening ceremony attended by key security sector stakeholders, officials from the Government of Senegal, the representative of the European Union Delegation, and the ECOWAS national focal point.
2. In his welcome message, Mr. Malick Diouf, representative of the Senegalese Minister of Foreign Affairs, acknowledged the honour of Senegal hosting the workshop. He also recalled the objectives of the workshop and the importance of national appropriation of the issue of governance and security sector reform (SSRG) and gave a brief description of the security context in West Africa and the Sahel with the resurgence of coups d'état and the prevalence of a system of conflicts that has yet to reveal all its secrets, especially in West Africa. He did not fail to point out that Senegal is very concerned about the current security threats. Thus, a common regional vision of security driven by ECOWAS remains an opportunity for all member states of the organization. After warmly thanking the partners for their support in holding the meeting, he declared the ECOWAS Training Workshop on Security Sector Reform and Governance duly opened.
3. Mr. Christoph Belzer, representative of the European Union Delegation in Senegal, also welcomed the opportunity for such a meeting given the common priorities between the African Union and the European Union expressed at the AU/EU Summit in Brussels. After a brief genesis of the Security Sector Reform and Governance Policy Framework adopted since 2016. Mr. Belzer highlighted the timeliness of holding such a meeting, in a context of growing security challenges in West Africa in particular. He also stressed the importance of adopting a common African reference framework from a security perspective, which is beset by a multitude of security threats. Mr. Belzer congratulated ECOWAS for the adoption of the SSRG Policy Framework, which is in line with current requirements in terms of response to security threats, thus confirming its commitment to peace and security issues. He concluded by congratulating Senegal on its efforts in including the issue of governance and security sector reform in its national agenda. Finally, he welcomed the idea of strengthening the partnership between the African Union and the European Union with a view to improving governance of the security sector in West Africa.
4. Dr. Niagale Bagayoko, Chair of the African Security Sector Network (ASSN), began by expressing her thanks to the State of Senegal through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which presided over the opening ceremony. She also thanked the GIZ and the European Union for the support provided in hosting the workshop. Introducing the ASSN, which works for democratic governance of the security sector, Dr Bagayoko also recalled the successful experience of collaboration between ECOWAS and the ASSN. She then gave a brief history of the process of developing and adopting the ECOWAS Policy Framework for security sector governance and reform in 2016 and its entry into force from 2021. She also commended ECOWAS for its pioneering approach in initiating the process of designing and adopting a

number of instruments for the promotion of good governance but much of which are unfortunately, currently suffering from obsolescence due to lack of revisions in a very dynamic context. Recalling the various contributions of the ASSN in the process of developing these instruments, she reiterated the objectives of the ASSN built around the principle of the “reverse training curriculum” whose basic premise is: “the solution to conflicts can only come from African endogenous expertise”. According to her, the workshop should be considered a mutual enrichment session rather than a learning experience and should be a forum to popularize and strengthen the ECOWAS Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform and Governance.



Presentations and expectations of participants

5. During the presentations, the participants, expressed very diverse profiles: state actors, members of women's organizations, members of various civil society organizations, members of supervisory bodies, representatives of the judiciary, officials of the parliamentary administration, representative of the President of the Bar Association, journalists, technical and financial partners, etc.
6. Following the individual presentations of the participants was their expectations according to their diverse professional perspectives in relation to the security sector. A review of all the expectations expressed and a synthesis of these expectations led to the following main points:
 - a) To have a good understanding of the ECOWAS Policy Framework on SSRG and the fundamental



principles of SSRG

- b) To better understand the role of women and their involvement in the security sector
- c) To have a better understanding and knowledge of the current security challenges facing the ECOWAS region
- d) To explore the various security sector reforms that can effectively combat the asymmetric threats that plague the ECOWAS region
- e) To better understand ECOWAS' SSR strategy and to question approaches to providing West African states with more effective militaries and frameworks within which security sector stakeholders play an effective role
- f) To collect views and experiences as well as solutions that appear relevant to all actors involved in security sector governance and reform in order to have better management at regional level
- g) To acquire new skills in understanding and analysing security issues in order to better contribute to governance and security sector reform
- h) To better understand how stakeholders other than the armed forces (civil society, supervisory bodies, ombudsman, etc.) are involved in governance and security sector reform
- i) To contribute to better governance of the security sector, integrating an inclusive dynamic, but also accountability of decision-makers to the citizens who are supposed to benefit from public policies

7. Due to the constraints linked to the Covid-19 pandemic still in force, some of the speakers, resource persons and facilitators at the workshop could not make the trip. Thus the format of the workshop was hybrid, alternating virtual and face-to-face. Furthermore, as a large number of the facilitators were English-speaking, the workshop was held over the three days in both French and English. The services of interpreters were mobilized for this purpose.

8. The diversity of the participants' profiles was a determining factor in the methodology used, which is andragogic, therefore adapted to an adult audience, alternating presentations, interactions, question/answer, group work, etc. This allowed all the topics to be addressed in depth and above all to allow all the participants to contribute according to their perspective and concerns. Participants also contributed according to their perspective and concerns.

Module 1: Background to the design of the ECOWAS framework on Governance and Security Sector Reform - by Okey Uzochina

9. In this session, the following points were discussed: the rationale for SSRG, the basic elements of SSRG, SSRG as a determinant of peace and security, the objectives, the key principles, the targets, the role of ECOWAS in the ownership process.

10. The objectives of the ECOWAS SSRG Policy Framework were noted as follows :

- a) To eliminate threats to individuals and groups in the ECOWAS region



- b) To focus on the capacities of institutions and organizations, individuals and groups involved in the security sector
- c) To ensure the emergence and consolidation of the security sectors in ECOWAS Member States

11. The key principles of the ECOWAS Policy Framework on SSRG are :

- a) To promote African and West African solidarity and partnership
- b) To respect national sovereignty and territorial integrity
- c) To support regional integration
- d) To promote regional and national ownership of SSRG by creating an enabling environment
- e) To place SSRG in specific contexts
- f) To develop a gender perspective, essential for decision-making in the field of peace and security
- g) To develop a human rights perspective.
- h) The key elements of the ECOWAS Policy Framework on SSRG are
- i) The existence of a national security policy
- j) Periodic review and needs assessment
- k) Effective professionalization and modernization
- l) Involvement of customary authorities and grassroots communities
- m) Effective involvement of the media and civil society organizations
- n) The reality of democratic control and institutional control
- o) The effectiveness of a good resource mobilization strategy
- p) The existence of a national framework for cooperation and partnership
- q) The reality of a communication strategy and the existence of a monitoring and evaluation mechanism

12. Within the framework of its implementation, ECOWAS assumes a number of roles, namely a normative role, a facilitating role, a capacity-building role and finally a supervisory role.

13. The discussions mainly focused on the justification of the need for security sector reform, the integration of the human security dimension in governance and security sector reform, the importance of national ownership of the ECOWAS SSRG policy framework, the involvement of the community as an essential component in the realization of a national security policy and finally, the responsibilities that ECOWAS seems to be abandoning in the face of political instabilities within certain states and the various current security threats. In this regard, it should be noted that ECOWAS' capacity to enrol actors is weak.



Module 2: Strengthening the security sector in Senegal: political leadership, local ownership and monitoring - by Dr. Niagale Bagayoko

14. The presentation was structured around the following points:

- a) The singular historical trajectory of the Senegalese army
- b) A review of internal and external security issues
- c) Senegal's well-established international image
- d) The existence of a security apparatus with contrasting realities as well as strong and weakpoints.
- e) The institutional and organizational set-up of the Senegalese security apparatus, which is coherent and legible

15. In addition, a review of the components of the Senegalese security sector allows us to identify them: the armed forces, the gendarmerie, the national police, the intelligence services and the penitentiary sector.

16. Governance and reform of the security sector includes, according to the presenter, an oversight component that highlights the governance of the sector. This control is exercised in various ways:

- a) Parliamentary control and oversight of the security sector in Senegal;
- b) The control of the justice sector; and
- c) Public control of the media and civil society

17. The presentation finally noted that the challenges to be met for optimal governance of the security sector in Senegal are numerous:

- a) Imperfection of the institutional framework to guarantee a real governance of the security sector in Senegal, despite a relatively clear definition of the competences of the different bodies that compose it and a separation of powers guaranteed by the system
- b) Existence of a 'presidentialist' regime, conducive to a concentration of power, a potential vulnerability factor in Senegal's security sector governance
- c) Resurgence of the conflict in Casamance which has lasted for more than four decades and is still unresolved
- d) Regional geopolitical developments and the risk of Senegal becoming a transit zone for violent extremists operating in Mali in particular.

18. The discussions focused on several points that allowed for a detailed exploration of the security system and Senegal's national security policy. In this regard, the historical fact was brought up, thus making it possible to make the link between the performance of the Senegalese security sector and the democratization process that began a decade before the historic La Baule speech. Similarly, the Senegalese institutional system, inspired by the French model, makes for an operational control system exercised at several levels: parliament, justice, citizens (media and civil society).



19. Finally, with regards to the governance of the security sector in Senegal, we can note that :

- a) Senegal has been able to base its strategies on viable fundamentals, thus guaranteeing a certain independence and balance of power.
- b) The lack of mechanisms to preserve gains in some African countries. The Republic of Guinea was advanced in SSR but has seen a decline in its military apparatus in recent years
- c) The national police in Senegal currently promotes human security and bases its actions on the following elements: fighting crime, ensuring internal security, and conducting peacekeeping operations. Since 1981, the integration of women has been a reality.
- d) Natural resource management should be a perspective to be developed in the framework of SSRG.
- e) The main problem remains the relationship between ECOWAS and its member states. There are many instruments and acts defined but not internalized by the states.

Module 3: Towards greater surveillance of defence and security forces in the ECOWAS region - by Dr. Emile Ouédraogo

20. The presenter referred to a study on the security sector in Africa which identified several dysfunctions in the security architecture of states due to the absence of national strategy and defence policy documents and others relating to sectoral security policies.

21. After clarifying some key concepts (national security, national security policy, national security strategy, sectoral strategy, national interests, national vision and values), the presenter focused on the concept of national security, its history and, above all, its appropriation in the Francophone space very recently. The choice of the concept of national security stems from the analysis of a new context in which the reality of new threats emerges, the diversity of which requires the definition of non-military defence strategies.

22. Turning to the issue of national security policy, the presenter clarified the conditions necessary for the definition of a national security policy, the essential challenges in its definition, the need, upstream, to make a global assessment and an analysis of the environment, threats and needs, before making budgetary choices.

23. As regards the budgetary aspect, there was a consensus on the importance of providing resources after a rigorous diagnosis for the effective implementation of any national security policy. However, the question is not so much to give it a budget as to carry out the budget. Today, in many African countries, the process of developing a national security policy has begun.

24. The discussions were structured around the following points:

- a) From a budgetary point of view, a process of openness and de-compartmentalization is noted,



- which is an important factor that can guarantee success. Indeed, for several years, the budget of the armed forces has been debated in plenary session during the vote on the initial finance law in the National Assembly. However, in the early 2000s, a period of non-transparency was noted in the elaboration of the budget due to the political practices of the then majority in the National Assembly.
- b) Senegal has developed a national security policy based on a very inclusive approach, with consultation of the population at the grassroots level.
 - c) In the process of developing Senegal's national security policy, civil society has been able to play a key role, as have institutions such as the Centre des Hautes Études de Défense et de Sécurité (Centre for Advanced Studies in Defence and Security) (CHESD). It is therefore a long-term process that has been initiated by several actors.
 - d) In making strategic choices about national security policy, it is important:
 - i. not to focus on the allocation of budgets, without first defining a framework of analysis and an analysis of the context itself which, if poorly done, risks causing bad choices and therefore, unsuccessful investments.
 - ii. to avoid any subcontracting approach which is ineffective and a potential factor of failure
 - iii. to integrate a preventive component that allows for the anticipation of certain challenges and potential points of vulnerability
 - iv. to know what the objective is, to assess the needs and to justify the choices made.
 - e) Downstream of the budget execution; it is important to define the modalities of control of the budget linked to the implementation of the national security policy. This is a condition that can guarantee good governance of the security sector, which is often characterized by a certain opacity. In Senegal, the National Assembly plays this role but rarely implements it due to the lack of technical capacity of Members of Parliaments, the short timeframe for exercising this control, the absence of technical support, etc. Similarly, it is often noted that political imbalances make the National Assembly a recording chamber, thus rendering ineffective any control mission that should be assumed by parliament.
 - f) Furthermore, in terms of the execution of the budget of the armed forces in Senegal, there was a period during which the execution rate did not exceed 50% of the estimated budget of the State of Senegal due to difficulties in mobilizing resources. Finally, the last factor causing lack of legibility and control of the budget, but above all, the difficulties of the National Assembly to play an oversight role, is linked to the delay in the vote of the regulation law of the year n-1 which must precede the vote of the budget of the year n.



Module 4: Intelligence and National Security Management - by Ambassador Johnny Kwadjo

25. The objective of the presentation was to share African experiences and bring them to the Senegalese context. The presentation emphasized the importance of strengthening control and supervision over the defence and security forces due to the tendency to devote a lot of resources to them. It called for the role of parliament in the control of budgets allocated to the Defence and Security Forces (DSF) and highlighted the obstacles to their effective control:

- a) Submission to democratically elected civil authority
- b) The dilemma between confidentiality and transparency
- c) Self-censorship or the lack of parliamentary control over national security issues
- d) The dark side of cooperation

26. It also defined some indicators to assess the effectiveness of the DSF budget control and best practices.

27. The presenter proceeded to a question and answer session to discuss the DSF budget, mentioning the prioritization of sectors, the appropriateness of debating the DSF budget in the National Assembly and the processes by which control and supervision mechanisms can be strengthened.

28. In another part of his presentation, the link between intelligence and national security management was made to highlight the centrality of intelligence to both political as well as peace and security processes.

29. Referring to the Ghanaian model, he recalled the prerogatives of Ghana's National Security Council and the way in which Ghana's parliamentary oversight of intelligence is exercised.

30. The discussions raised several points, namely: the need to mobilize material and financial resources for effective intelligence, the importance of collaboration and partnership due to the transnational nature of the threats, the challenge of recruitment which must integrate endogenous factors, and the challenge of information management.

31. Continuing the discussion, participants mentioned the project to set up a secure information-sharing platform, which raises hopes, particularly as an opportunity to strengthen intelligence in West Africa. Indeed, the establishment of the WAEMU Peace and Security Delegation can be a starting point and could be the beginning of a process that will extend to ECOWAS and cascade to the African Union.



DAY TWO

Module 5: Police and Police Oversight - by Sean Tait

32. This presentation reminded participants of the essential nature of oversight in the governance of the security sector and of the risks of inexpert management of this sector which can negatively impact the entire security system.

33. Turning to police oversight, the presenter emphasized the reasons for its importance in the security sector ecosystem, before listing the challenges to effective police oversight, particularly in Africa, and outlining the characteristics of effective and efficient oversight. He also presented the aspects of oversight that are :

- a) Anticipation and consequence management
- b) Multiple spheres
- c) The whole organization
- d) Set of organizational systems
- e) Information as a medium

34. In addition, the presenter recalled:

- a) benchmarks for an external control system and for effective parliamentary oversight,
- b) the elements involved in a comprehensive approach to the monitoring process
- c) the 5 A's rule (*Authority, Accountability, Adaptation, Attitude, Ability*) which is an approach whereby effective parliamentary scrutiny is likely to be exercised as an opportunity for external scrutiny
- d) the conditions for enhanced parliamentary control (human resources, budget, parliamentary rules of procedure and program)

35. The presentation was followed by group work. The participants were divided into three groups and discussed how governance and security sector reform in Senegal could be supported, what role monitoring could play in this and how monitoring could be supported in the short, medium and long term.

36. The feedback from the working groups provided concrete answers. With regards to the means of control, it was proposed that the police and the gendarmerie be integrated for internal control, to mobilize the state control bodies, parliament and civil society for external control and finally to have recourse to control by the judiciary in order to fight against police blunders. With regard to the support to be provided to strengthen monitoring, several recommendations were made:

- a) To have a better perception of the police by the population
- b) To develop a confidence-building program with community police but also with local authorities such as neighbourhood Imams
- c) To draw a clear line between the duty of reserve and the freedom of whistle blowers
- d) To improve the political framework which is often hostile to certain freedoms, such as

demonstrations.

- e) To strengthen the police through better physical protection of officers and training and curriculum revision.

37. The plenary discussions following the feedback from the group work, provided an opportunity to revisit :

- a) the importance of monitoring, especially in the context of the human rights imperative,
- b) the different types of control that can be exercised to make supervision effective and avoid abuses of power,
- c) the principle of the permanence of control mechanisms,
- d) and finally, the need to strengthen the existing system in Senegal as well as its efficiency and professionalism.



Module 6: Corrections, Human Rights, Safety and Security - by UjuAgomoh

38. This presentation began by demonstrating the interplay between corrections, human rights, safety and security in a given country.

39. Developing the argument further, the presenter elaborated on the challenges to be met in the management of correctional services for the justice-security-integration continuum, the targets to be



addressed, the issue of reintegration by offenders, the use of information through intelligence, the crucial role of prison services in governance and security sector reform, the critical issue of reintegration, information management

40. Furthermore, the presenter referred to several legal instruments relating to prison services and the role of these instruments in SSRG within a given country, as well as the interrelationship between financial services and the communities that receive victims and offenders.

41. During the discussions, the specific cases of Senegal, Nigeria and Rwanda were examined by the presenter. We can note from these different cases:

- a) As regards Senegal, a report was made on the situation of the prison services, its progress and difficulties, mainly concerning accommodation, the strategies defined to reduce prison overcrowding, and the efforts made to improve the living conditions of prisoners. Finally, it was pointed out that an effective policy of assistance for the reintegration of prisoners, has resulted in the emergence of a prison industry that has penetrated the large-scale distribution of food products.
- b) Nigeria, for its part, has gone a long way in shifting paradigms and options for decongesting prisons by focusing on community service and parole.
- c) The case of Rwanda is a good practice, particularly marked by the solutions provided following the genocide to address overcrowding of prisons.

Through the concept of restorative justice, the country has managed to establish an endogenous and productive prison management policy.

42. Following the presentation and subsequent discussions, the presenter introduced group work, which tested the participants' level of understanding of the issues addressed in this module. It was also an opportunity to assess the participants' abilities:

- a) to analyse a context marked by violent practices, taking into account the receptivity of the prison, the profiles of the perpetrators and victims, the type of offence to be linked to the sanctions,
- b) to take into account factors other than the legal framework for the optimal handling of prison issues, which is an important component of security sector governance and reform.

43. The presentations made it possible to return to the specific case of Senegal with regard to its prison policy, the impact of certain laws on the overcrowding of prisons (e.g. the law criminalizing drug trafficking), the efforts that need to be made by the authorities to rectify the management of prison services and the need to deal with overcrowding promptly, as well as to strengthen the staff of the judiciary and address the issue of reintegration.



Module 7: Governance, Maritime Security and Maritime Threat Management - by Kamal-Deen Ali

44. This presentation established a link between fisheries and security sector reform, especially in a context of dwindling resources. This situation obliges actors in the fisheries sector to seek alternative income, which leads them to take risks that can impact on their security and, consequently, have repercussions on the governance of the security sector.

45. The presenter also mentioned the intervention of an important category of actors in the value chain, namely women, who may also be affected. Finally, he mentioned the negative impacts of the scarcity of fisheries products, notably drug trafficking, food insecurity, etc.

46. During the discussions, participants discussed the following points: the negative impact of the discovery of oil and gas products in Senegal's maritime waters, the lack of parliamentary attention to the issue, the specific case of Nigeria, which has placed the issue at the heart of the public debate, as well as the multiple challenges of managing Senegal's maritime territory

47. In addition, during the discussions, participants addressed the issue of appropriate institutional governance to ensure the security of coastal communities, the need for cooperation between institutions from different sectors to drive an effective national security system and the related challenges.

48. From the exchanges held, we retain the following elements:

- a) The importance of the fisheries sector in Senegal's economy requires the integration of the maritime sector in the reforms, governance and actions addressed to the security sector.
- b) It is particularly important to put in place an intelligence system for security sector reform in the face of the various vulnerabilities and criminalities noted in the maritime and fisheries sectors, the effects of which can impact on Senegal's security system.

Module 8: Promoting Democratic Governance and Accountability in External Support to Security Sector Reform by Fatoumata Sira Diallo

49. In introducing the premise for any reform (existence of imperfections and limitations), the presenter defined SSR as a process by which states formulate or reorient policies, structures, people and institutions involved in the security sector to make them more effective, efficient, responsive to the security and justice needs of the population, transparent, accountable and respectful of human rights.

50. The presentation covered:

- a) the objectives and basic premise of SSR,
- b) the major points to be taken into account in the implementation of SSR, including the problem of resource mobilization which, if too extraverted, can generate harmful dependence, undermine the control of the process and also lead to the absence of state commitment.
- c) effective management of external support which includes :



- a reliable mechanism for financial accountability and transparency
 - the definition of priorities on an endogenous basis
 - aligning aid with national needs
 - implementation coordinated by the national side
 - harmonization of all external support
 - the choice of appropriate human resources
 - the choice of technicians who have good theoretical knowledge and practical expertise
 - a balanced distribution of resources between the different sectors
 - alignment with national priorities
 - a balance between national and donor interests
- d) the application of the principles of effective management of security sector development assistance, and in this regard, the successful example of Rwanda was shared, where the key to success was the establishment of a partner coordination framework, the imposition of a single institutional entry point, an alignment of the country's development strategy with national priorities, and the establishment of a monitoring and evaluation mechanism
- e) Participants in this module discussed a wide range of issues, including the objectives of SSR, the connection of SSR to the concept of human security, good governance as the basis for SSR implementation, the history of SSR, the importance of national ownership of SSR, the focus on governance rather than reform in the Senegalese context, and the potential factors for implementation failure in an African context of institutional weakness. As a result, the challenge of SSR and a model based on internal funding has not been met.

51. Taking the floor again, the presenter highlighted the absence of a doctrine on SSR in Africa, which causes difficulties in the ability of African countries to impose a vision on the partners who accompany SSR, the conditions for good resource management, and the role that ECOWAS could play in stimulating unitary regional dynamics.

52. The presenter concluded by recalling the fundamental principles of SSR, which are

- The existence of a political will
- The existence of leadership
- National ownership of the reform
- The existence of a national vision
- The existence of a legal and institutional framework
- Implementation at national level
- The establishment of an aid coordination framework
- Alignment of external support with national priorities and policies
- Establishing accountability at all levels
- Constant communication and dialogue





DAY THREE

Module 9: Women, Gender and Security Sector Reform/Governance - by Titilope Ajayi

53. The presentation on Women, Gender and SSRG clarified the concepts revolving around the theme, linked the concept of gender with the SSRG, specified the principle of transversality; recalled the importance of gender in SSRG in view of several factors (contextual, practical and philosophical).

54. The presenter revisited the principles of gender mainstreaming in SSRG (effectiveness, accountability, inclusiveness and participation) and the interest that are :

- a) To take into account the gender perspective: considering that men and women need security from different perspectives
- b) To address the needs of all and adopting response mechanisms
- c) To include all genders in security sector institutions, justice and decision making
- d) To take into account the essential role of all actors to make our security sector effective and efficient.

55. In addition, the presentation demonstrated the existence of a context that is now conducive to taking gender into account in all initiatives, especially with the SSRG. Indeed, it includes a large number of instruments to promote women's participation, allows for a strong mobilization of dedicated actors and promising strategies. In addition, there is a global Women-Peace-Security agenda that aims to normalize the inclusion of women and women's needs and concerns in all aspects of security.

56. Continuing her argument, the presenter shared an analytical tool that looks at five different dimensions of how a program, event, initiative, institution relates to and affects the need, access, participation, resources and impact of different gender groups: the "NAPR Wheel" which goes through the following questioning:

- a) Are women and men (including non-state actors as well as civil society) involved and consulted in the development, management and review of security issues?
- b) Are the security needs of women, men, youth and girls adequately addressed in national security policymaking?
- c) Does the security sector within a state have the necessary policies, protocols, personnel structures, curricula and resources to support the needs of these different actors?
- d) Is there a healthy, non-discriminatory environment?

57. A sub-module was presented by the representative of the ECOWAS Women's Peace and Security Network, Mr. Sidy Cissé who recalled the context in which REPSFECO came into being, creating the link with the establishment of a specialized ECOWAS gender agency (ECOWAS Centre for Gender Development), mentioned the results of REPSFECO, the difficulties encountered in carrying out its missions, the results achieved by the organization and, finally, the challenges to meet.

58. Following Mr. Cissé's presentation, discussions focused on Senegal's experience with the recruitment of women into the SDF and the challenges of integrating gender into security sector



governance:

- a) Lack of political will in some ECOWAS Member States
- b) Difficulties in mobilizing resources, particularly in implementing UNSCR 1325
- c) Socio-cultural barriers
- d) The existence of objective biological factors that may limit the massive integration of women into the SDF

59. To conclude, the importance of gender mainstreaming in the security sector was reiterated. Such initiatives should aim at the following:

- a) To integrate gender into any SRHR process/activity from conceptualization to evaluation.
- b) To deconstruct barriers to gender-equitable participation: for example, rigid gender roles/norms.
- c) To build capacity in gender and SSRG: both are highly specialized thematic areas that require expertise to engage meaningfully.
- d) To take into account transversality because gender groups are not homogeneous; they are influenced by age, education, social class, ethnicity, marital status, political alliances, etc.
- e) To take into account diversity.
- f) To consider that gender priorities and considerations should be integrated into the national SSRG strategy/plan which is in synergy with the national frameworks on women, peace and security.
- g) To consider that gender is not women's business; gender is everyone's business.

Module 10: How is SSR coordination defined and why is it essential? Lessons from Sierra Leone - by Alhaji Morlai Kargbo

60. The presenter shared the experience of coordinating security sector reform in Sierra Leone, highlighting its essence and challenges, in order to highlight the relevance of lessons learned for Senegal.

61. Sierra Leone's National Security Strategy is a framework designed to ensure that the country is prepared and can respond to current and future security threats, but also to ensure that the country is able to respond to the threats of the future:

- In order to address the shortcomings inherent in the provision of security sector services, it adopts an integrated approach that includes the security and protection of people;
- It was designed to balance the need for national security with the protection of Sierra Leone's core values of openness, diversity and respect for civil liberties;
- The national security policy and strategy creates the overall values and priorities that guide the provision, management and oversight of state security and, therefore, a basis for SSR;

62. Sierra Leone's national security has a hybrid architecture :

- Sierra Leone undertook a widely acclaimed post-war SSR as part of post-conflict peacebuilding efforts.
- SSR has emphasized as democratic civilian oversight of the security sector, thus highlighting the crucial role of the National Security Council (NSC) and other security supervision bodies.
- The NSC and its various sub-committees embody the national security architecture of Sierra



Leone.

- This architecture has adopted a coordinated and collaborative approach to security and intelligence.

63. With regards to the lessons to be learned from the Sierra Leonean experience for Senegal, the presenter chose several lines of thought:

- The SSR contexts for Sierra Leone and Senegal differ significantly, however the answers to the key questions can help determine the needs and content of SSR in Senegal
- The few questions that can be answered are the following:
 - What is the level of democratic governance and control of the security forces?
 - What is the level of involvement of the civilian population in maintaining peace and security?
 - What is the state of civil-military relations?
 - What is the capacity and level of efficiency and professionalism of the institutions responsible for internal security?
 - What is the level of coordination between the institutions constituting the national security architecture?
 - What is the degree of deepening of democracy, the multi-party framework and the level of national cohesion?

64. In the discussions, participants raised the following points:

- a) Addressing the judicial dimension in relation to crimes that probably took place during the crisis: after the war the Peace and Reconciliation Commission allowed tongues to be loosened. Today we can ask governments why certain recommendations were not respected. In the army there were soldiers from different factions. These factions no longer exist. The reform of the justice system was made possible by the reform. Before the commission, crimes were condemned in accordance with the Treaty of Rome.
- b) Existence of synergy between national civil society organizations and their involvement in SSR: there is no direct representation of civil society in the National Security Council, but there is full representation at local district level: chiefdoms, with greater effectiveness.
- c) Child soldiers (involvement in the conflict, security and reintegration): Child soldiers were the most ferocious during the war. They were rehabilitated; however, the leaders were held accountable. Everyone called themselves rebels but there was no stigma. Everyone's effort rehabilitated them.
- d) Consideration of mining resources as a tool for financing terrorism: Information came from the secret services and there was unhealthy competition between the security services, resulting in a lot of unauthentic information, which led to the reform of the National Intelligence Verification Committee. After the war, there is a reform of the mining sector with the creation of an agency to manage it and especially international collaboration.
- e) Option of reconstruction or security sector reform in Sierra Leone: the best option was reconstruction. The army was dismantled because of the amalgamation of soldiers and rebels. Many of the fighters were rebels, so reconstituted forces were needed. The rebels were not ethnically based from the beginning. During the war, ethnic groups formed to fight, stay and defend themselves. The situation could have been worse.



- F) Links between instability and natural resources in Sierra Leone and measures for the equitable distribution of resources among the population: the war has turned resources that should be a blessing into a curse. The rebels who were supposed to be defeated quickly at the beginning were supported by warlords, over time. The armed forces also wanted to take over the mining areas. However, today, mining resources are well used and fairly distributed.

DIALOGUE/PANEL

Improving national coordination and strengthening accountability and democratic oversight of the security sector in Senegal - by the Participants

65. Participants tried to provide answers to the question of what kind of structure should be put in place for Senegal for effective governance of the security sector. It should be recognized that belonging to a specific category mainly determined the opinions.

NB: The opinions were expressed by the participants, notably those from the administration as well as those from the defence and security forces, subject to the agreement of their superiors.

66. Civil society representative

Senegal has had a unique experience in the governance of its security sector, due to a certain lull in the conflict that has raged in Casamance in the south of the country for over four decades. Similarly, it has not been confronted with structural security crises or governance of its security sector since its accession to international sovereignty. Hence the relevance of not focusing on the 'reform' aspect, but rather on the 'governance' aspect, which is an ongoing process. Therefore, tackling the issue of security in Senegal requires developing a 'human security' perspective that integrates respect for human rights, the protection of people and property, and the broadening of the security spectrum to other areas (health, environment, food, maritime, etc.). Thus, in the process of defining and implementing a national security policy (good governance of the security sector), taking into account its history and achievements in terms of SSG, Senegal can appropriately place itself in a preventive posture. The proposed approach to establishing an adequate security sector governance framework in Senegal is as follows:

- To identify factors of insecurity in order to prevent them;
- To identify the needs of the population, in terms of security, and propose solutions, according to the means available;
- To take the human factor into account;
- To develop logistical requirements ;
- To design a training plan and then to have an action plan and the necessary resources;
- To be part of a process of setting up a national framework for governance of the security sector made up of the police, the army, the gendarmerie, the civil society, Customs, the fire brigade, the civil protection, etc.

67. Army representative

Senegal is in the process of finalizing its national security strategy, built around a holistic approach, in order to optimize resources, avoid duplication and redundancy and above all to achieve convincing



results. Actions can be taken in the same vein to accompany the implementation of this national security strategy in Senegal. To do this, the following actions are required

- We need to be a force of proposal to advise decision-makers to enable them identify security challenges.
- There is need for a holistic vision in deepening the achievements in the security sector in Senegal, with a spectrum of expertise.
- It is important to have a vision of modernization of the security sector in Senegal, rather than reform.
- To Maximize the effectiveness of institutions through coordination of sectoral approaches and optimization of resources
- To cultivate a change of mind-set that security is everyone's business.
- In the context of the fight against terrorism, it is necessary to identify a leading institution that will serve as a gateway, with a view to coordinating responses, following the example of the positive experience of the fight against Covid-19. Indeed, during that crisis, the Ministry of Health was the leading institution around which the other institutions and actors clustered for a concerted response.
- To include people in security sector governance

68. Representative of the National Assembly

The parliament has the task of controlling government action, voting on laws and has an eye on security issues through parliamentary enquiries that can be carried out, written questions addressed to the ministers in charge of the security issue, but also in the framework of the Defence Committee in the National Assembly.

Political will is needed to achieve such a framework. Similarly, changes and reforms within a state framework must have a legal basis.

The National Assembly supports the creation of a consultation mechanism and proposes:

- To report on the meeting to the institutions that are represented and to be part of a perspective of renewal of parliamentary representation;
- To define the principles of synergy between actors, with a view to creating a mechanism that can contribute to the democratic governance of the security sector
- A territorial network to take into account all areas where conflict factors exist;
- To take into account the existence of a culture of violence in Senegal, particularly electoral violence, which should be integrated into the reflection. Outbreaks of violence in Senegal (23 June 2012, March 2021) are evidence of this culture of violence. It is important to propose strategies for managing these forms of violence.

69. Justice representative

There is a ministerial framework for coordinating the fight against terrorism. The management of security-related aspects falls under the sovereignty of the state, which is "jealous" of its prerogatives, hence the difficulty in defining frameworks not tied to the state to deal with these issues. It is therefore necessary to:

- To organize upstream, thinking together before acting
- To reflect on the formalization of a framework to be put in place and therefore the mission will be to move into the security field
- To explore the possibility of setting up a structure that can be attached to a ministerial



department (e.g. the Ministry of the Interior) and then, have a unit of action.

- It should be noted that until a clear framework is defined, it will be impossible to propose a multi-stakeholder mechanism that would address security issues.

Proposal:

- To share the report of the meeting, which can be amended if necessary and submitted for assessment to the institutions likely to join the framework.

70. Representative of the National Police

One of the expected outcomes of this workshop is to make security everyone's business. Therefore the creation of a multi-stakeholder framework to reflect on the governance of the security sector is relevant.

Proposal:

- To build on existing models through a bottom-up approach:
 - Establishment of Local Committees
 - Establishment of departmental committees
 - Establishment of a National Steering Committee
- To strengthen the culture of citizenship
- To adapt responses to the real security needs of Senegal today. For example, in the reflection, propose strategies for the protection of oil and gas resource exploitation infrastructure

71. Representative of the Ombudsman of the Republic

Senegal has been lucky enough to evolve in a stable, peaceful and peaceful environment that should be preserved. Thus:

- The process of reflection on the governance of the security sector in Senegal must focus on the potential vulnerabilities of the country's security system.
- Senegal has been carrying out reforms for several years, but the human security dimension had not been explicitly taken into account. It is therefore important to invest in it by including the population, civil society, the media, etc.
- It is also necessary to mobilize the existing instruments of social mediation in order to create synergies
- With regard to the lack of civic-mindedness, there is work to be done in terms of upgrading, raising awareness and changing attitudes so that the SDF are now seen by the population as partners

72. Representative of the National Gendarmerie

Senegal has a dynamic security system that is being reformed. The national gendarmerie is currently reviewing its policies. Similarly, a mechanism for democratic control of the armed forces is being put into operation through parliamentary and judicial channels. Internal control is also being revitalized in important respects.

It is relevant to remember that Senegal is not in a bubble, so the international cooperation aspect is essential in defining a relevant governance framework. An interconnection must therefore be taken into account due to the transnational nature of the threats.

In addition, from the point of view of internal security, there are experiences of dealing with security issues through composite frameworks; they integrate the population, the defence and security forces,



the decentralized administration, etc. In Goudomp, a pilot project financed by USAID is being implemented through citizen control actions and has made it possible to effectively combat cattle theft. In the national security strategy model, this is an experience that could be drawn on. This will make it possible to integrate the issue of accountability into the functioning of this future framework in order to strengthen the confidence of the population in the SDF.

73. Representative of the Bar Association

The workshop brought together a heterogeneous assembly of "dressed corps" dependent on well-organized hierarchies and civilians who do not answer to any authority. Security issues have a regalian dimension. Serious thought should therefore be given to how these different profiles of actors (state and non-state) can work together.

Other particularities: we live in a democratic system, but there are forms of mistrust of authority that can lead to security risks. Political differences must also be taken into account in the management of the security sector in Senegal, as they can create instability. Furthermore, Senegal is a republic in which religious forces have their weight. Taking into account all these specific realities is necessary to reflect first on the feasibility of such a framework of collaboration:

- Is the establishment of a coalition for security sector governance possible?
- Who should join
- Failing a coalition, to propose a think tank
- To think about the means too: who should be responsible for mobilizing the means?

Proposal:

- To lay the foundations for such a framework by reporting back to the officials and institutions that are represented
- To refer to the organizers in exploring the feasibility of proposals made by other actors

74. Representative of the Peace and Security Network for Women in the ECOWAS region Security is transversal and omnipresent in our spaces of action and interaction. It is impossible for the state to take optimal charge of it without an inclusive approach. Likewise, a plurality of factors are involved in it without coordination. It is therefore important to create synergy between the actors. In the management of security issues, early warning is poorly addressed; it is therefore important that the future framework to be set up develops this dimension.

In addition, civil society faces many obstacles due to difficulties in accessing information in the security sector. Such a framework will remove these obstacles and will be able to develop collaborative approaches between the SDF and civil society, which usually does research, analysis and advocacy work that can benefit the SDF in decision-making. Thus, such a framework will allow the development of partnerships and an opening up of the SDF to other non-state actors. In addition, it is necessary to consider:

- the form that this framework should take
- the possibilities of setting up a Senegalese chapter of the African Security Sector Network

75. Summary of panel discussions

On balance, there is a consensus on the timeliness and relevance of setting up a mechanism to contribute to security sector governance in Senegal.

It will be necessary to look at :



- Its specific missions: mainly to make contributions to support the authorities in the ongoing process of governance of the security sector in Senegal
- Its form: a coalition, an association, a think tank or a state structure established by presidential decree
- Its composition: on this point, it is suggested that a structure be set up that includes all categories of actors involved in the security sector or related issues in Senegal, with a lead to be given to civil society, which has the characteristics of responsiveness, independence and dynamism.
- The process of formalization: sequencing between the short term and the medium/long term
- In the short term, it is necessary to :
 - a) share the first results of the meeting, establish a mailing list for sharing the final report which will then be submitted to the participants for validation,
 - b) identify a focal point to liaise and follow up
 - c) express the ambition of bringing together the actors.
- In the medium/long term, to move towards the concretization of the ambitions expressed during this last session of the workshop, by reflecting on the framework (form and content) with light coordination
- Institutional support: explore all possible scenarios by seeking an institutional anchor with the State of Senegal. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs seems to be the entry point at the level of the Senegalese State. In addition, taking into account the theme of the meeting, a point of contact with the national representation of ECOWAS in Senegal should be explored.

Evaluation, Synthesis, Recommendations

76. With regards to general aspects, the evaluation sheets revealed the following:

- a) Participants have a good understanding of the conditions necessary to achieve a peaceful and secure environment
- b) The participants expressed their views on how ECOWAS could contribute to improving their security with clarity and relevance through :
 - the effective application of policies and regulations,
 - strengthening the means to fight terrorism and cross-border crime,
 - synergy, coordination of actions to ensure overall security,
 - the pooling of air, sea and land resources,
 - the application of agreements on the free movement of persons and goods within the ECOWAS region
- c) The participants proposed concrete actions to ECOWAS to make the population feel safe:
 - Conducting human rights monitoring missions
 - Compliance with Community provisions

77. With regard to the national context for security sector governance, national security policy and national security strategy: when asked whether the national security strategy or security sector governance is effective, participants felt that :

- Senegal has had a stable security policy since independence, despite the ongoing conflict in Casamance
- Senegal has a good security system, but it can be improved.



78. To this end, the participants recommend:

- To strengthen the capacity of civil society on security issues
- To strengthen the training of the SDF in this regard
- To use social networks, media,
- To organize open days for institutions that manage the security sector
- To initiate civil-military activities to create proximity

79. With regard to SSR coordination and national ownership, it was noted that there is nonational SSR coordination office. Thus, the participants proposed :

- the creation of a consultation framework to improve cross-cutting participation and coordination of SSR by national stakeholders
- the positioning of civil society as a partner and interface between the population and the SDF in order to carry out awareness-raising actions to improve reception
- strengthening collaboration through contact and sharing of good practice

80. To improve national appropriation of SSR and democratic governance of the security sector, participants proposed :

- The creation of a framework for coordination and reflection on the reform of the security system
- The popularization of the concept of security sector reform
- Strengthening civic education
- The exchange and sharing of experience and good practice
- The affirmation of a political will at the top of the State
- The establishment of a Senegalese section of the ASSN

81. Regarding the aspects related to the holding of the workshop :

- A very high proportion of participants felt that the workshop had met the expectations expressed at the beginning of the workshop.
- Participants appreciated the interactive nature of the workshop, which helped to improve understanding of key principles and elements of SSR
- Participants noted that the training contributed to a better understanding of the role of youth, women and CSOs in planning, implementation and management in the security sector
- participants considered the length of the exchanges to be a little short
- participants indicated that the French language should be used more

82. Participants' recommend for the future:

- opt for shorter presentations
- improve on the time reserved for exchanges
- Give priority to presentations in French, using French-speaking resource persons

Closing remarks - by Dr Niagale Bagayoko

In her closing remarks, Dr. Bakayoko expressed her conviction that this three-day meeting constitutes a considerable added value in terms of sharing experiences and expertise in the field of security sector



reform and governance in West Africa. Senegal has a wealth of expertise in this area which has not been sufficiently explored.

To correct this bias, Dr Bakayoko proposed the establishment of a pool of Senegalese experts to make qualitative contributions to the SSGR debate. In addition, the French-speaking world has very few experts in the sector. Thus, the establishment of this pool will fill several gaps.

She further indicated that the reflections on the perspectives for the concretization of a multi-actor contribution framework for democratic governance of the security sector in Senegal are interesting and the proposals made will all be seriously considered.

Dr Bakayoko also encouraged the exchange of experiences, particularly between Ghana and Senegal, both of which have recorded effective achievements in their respective security sector governance initiatives.

She concluded that it is essential to implement the proposals made at the end of the meeting and noted that the establishment of a Senegalese chapter of the ASSN, including a strategy for mobilizing the necessary resources, remains an interesting prospect to explore.

Conclusion

The 3-day workshop introduced the issue of governance and security sector reform in Senegal. In more than one respect, it can be stated without hesitation that the objectives set were achieved.

The andragogic training technique employed, perfectly suited the target audience who were all appropriately selected. Indeed, all institutions with a role in the governance of the security sector but also in the definition of a credible and viable national security policy were represented: armed forces, national police, national gendarmerie, prison services, customs, fire brigade, civil protection. In the same vein, given the importance of democratic governance and the operationalization of control modalities for any security policy, the organizers rightly invited the national parliamentary representation, the judiciary, the Ombudsman of the Republic and civil society organizations of various kinds. Their contributions made it possible to broaden the spectrum of security governance and above all, reinforced the basic postulates of democratic governance of the security sector: inclusion, participation and transparency.

As regards the content of the training, the issue of security was approached "from all angles", thus enabling the participants to be introduced to the key conceptual bases to identify good practices in terms of SSRG through the sharing of experience, to discuss certain models but also certain aspects related to SSGR. In addition, the mobilization of a range of proven expertise in security policy, governance and security sector reform was a means of giving participants a voice, gathering their opinions and, above all, making gradual progress towards the objectives assigned to the workshop.



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The careful selection of participants added value to the discussions on SSRG in the Senegal context. The involvement of women and youth groups through the Senegalese civil society organizations represented at this workshop confirmed the organizers' to involve all the stakeholders, essential to the design of a credible national security policy and democratic governance of the security sector in Senegal.

The products of this meeting are of two kinds:

1. The commitment of all actors to join a national dynamic to contribute to the realization of a national security policy and democratic governance of the security sector in Senegal
2. The willingness of all actors to give concrete expression to this commitment through the establishment of a multi-actor, inclusive structure whose form, means, institutional support, etc. remain to be clarified.



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